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CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE 
LEGISLATURES: PUBLIC HEALTH 
OPPORTUNITY AND RISK 
DANIEL G. ORENSTEIN* & STANTON A. GLANTZ** 
Cannabis is widely used in the United States and internationally despite its 
illicit status, but that illicit status is changing.  In the United States, thirty-three 
states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical cannabis, and eleven 
states and D.C. have legalized adult use cannabis.  A majority of state medical 
cannabis laws and all but two state adult use laws are the result of citizen ballot 
initiatives, but state legislatures are beginning to seriously consider adult use 
legislation.  From a public health perspective, cannabis legalization presents a 
mix of potential risks and benefits, but a legislative approach offers an 
opportunity to improve on existing legalization models passed using the 
initiative process that strongly favor business interests over public health.  To 
assess whether state legislatures are acting on this opportunity, this Article 
examines provisions of proposed adult use cannabis legalization bills active in 
state legislatures as of February 2019 to evaluate the inclusion of key public 
health best practices based on successful tobacco and alcohol control public 
health policy frameworks.  Given public support for legalization, further 
adoption of state adult use cannabis laws is likely, but legalization should not 
be viewed as a binary choice between total prohibition and laissez faire 
commercialization.  The extent to which adult use cannabis laws incorporate 
or reject public health best practices will strongly affect their impact, and 
health advocates should work to influence the construction of such laws to 
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prioritize public health and learn from past successes and failures in regulating 
other substances. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cannabis1 is the most widely used psychoactive substance in the world that 
is under international control, with an estimated 181.8 million global users 
annually as of 2013.2  In the United States, cannabis is by far the most 
 
1. The terms “cannabis” and “marijuana” (and occasionally “marihuana”) all appear in state law.  
In some states, the terms are interchangeable.  See, e.g., S.B. 94, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) 
(replacing statutory references to “marijuana” with “cannabis”).  In others, the terms have critically 
different legal meanings.  See, e.g., State v. Medina, 836 P.2d 997, 999 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing 
to apply felony murder rule in a case involving drug possession because possession of “cannabis,” 
defined under state law as extracted resin and various preparations thereof, was classified as a felony, 
but possession of “marijuana,” defined as the plant itself, was not).  Scientifically, “Cannabis” refers 
to the entire plant genus, including the genetic variants (or possibly distinct species) Cannabis indica 
and Cannabis sativa.  NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS 
AND CANNABINOIDS 44 (2017), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24625/the-health-effects-of-cannabis-
and-cannabinoids-the-current-state [https://perma.cc/2FKS-7RDR].  “Marijuana” historically referred 
to the dried leaves and flowers of the plant, as distinguished from “hashish,” made from the resin or 
resin glands.  MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS: A HISTORY 7–8 (2015).  The word “marijuana” may derive 
from Mexican military slang for a prostitute or brothel, Maria y Juana (translating as Mary and Jane, 
and thus also the likely source for the American cannabis slang term “Mary Jane”), and there is a near-
limitless litany of jargon and slang terms for the plant (e.g., pot, weed, ganja, dope, grass) owing to the 
need for clandestine reference to an illegal product.  Id. at 158.  This Article generally uses “cannabis” 
(rather than “marijuana”) to acknowledge the rise of concentrates and extracts (including their use in 
edibles) as a significant and growing product area, in addition to consideration of the historical use of 
“marijuana” in the United States as a pejorative with racist and xenophobic overtones, though there is 
by no means consensus on terminology.  See Alex Halperin, Marijuana: Is It Time to Stop Using a 
Word with Racist Roots?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jan/29/marijuana-name-cannabis-racism 
[https://perma.cc/Q78P-B86F] (discussing racial history of the terminology).  But cf. Angela Chen, 
Why It Can Be Okay to Call It ‘Marijuana’ Instead of ‘Cannabis’, VERGE (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/19/17253446/marijuana-cannabis-drugs-racist-language-history 
[https://perma.cc/AM7M-B2TP] (arguing that “cannabis” is insufficiently specific because it is the 
name of the entire plant genus, which includes hemp, and that avoiding the term “marijuana” may erase 
the complicated and problematic racial history of criminalization of the substance). 
2. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE 
1 (2016), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/251056/9789241510240-
eng.pdf;jsessionid=67409FE8532C91491480A01A51878075?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/ME66-
AN4E] [hereinafter WHO, EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE]. 
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commonly used illicit substance, with an estimated 24 million people age 12 or 
older reporting use in the past thirty days (8.9% of that population) as of 2016.3  
Use is highest among those 18–25 years old (20.8%).4  While overall prevalence 
is far outpaced by licit substances tobacco (63.4 million users age 12 or older; 
23.5% of population) and alcohol (136.7 million users age 12 or older; 50.7% 
of population),5 cannabis use is remarkably6 and consistently7 high given the 
drug’s illicit status.8  
The illicit status of cannabis, however, is in a state of flux.  Despite 
continued illegality under federal law,9 between 1996 and June 2019, thirty-
three U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the territories of Guam, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands legalized use of cannabis for medical purposes, 
and eleven states, D.C., Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands legalized 
recreational or “adult use” of the drug.10  In these jurisdictions, a lucrative new 
 
3. REBECCA AHRNSBRAK, JONAKI BOSE, SARRA L. HEDDEN, RACHEL N. LIPARI, & EUNICE 
PARK-LEE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND 
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2016 NATIONAL SURVEY 
ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 14 (2017), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-
FFR1-2016/NSDUH-FFR1-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/K74R-DGLD]. 
4. Id. at 15. 
5. Id. at 7, 11. 
6. Among illicit drugs, cannabis use far exceeds all others in terms of use prevalence.  In 2016, 
an estimated 28.6 million persons age 12 and older used illicit drug in the past month.  Id. at 14.  Among 
these, 24.0 million used cannabis, but the second highest category was misuse of prescription pain 
killers at just 3.3 million users.  Id. 
7. Id. at 15.  Past-month cannabis use among all persons age 12 and older remained between 
6.0% and 8.9% from 2002–2016.  Id.  While overall prevalence increased over this timeframe, the 
increase is largely attributable to an increase in use by those over age 26 and to a lesser extent those 
18–25; use among adolescents 12–17 actually decreased.  Id.  
8. In fact, cannabis use rates peaked in the 1970s, despite tight federal control under the 
Controlled Substances Act.  NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 62.  
9. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
10. State Policy, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/states/ 
[https://perma.cc/7CKZ-GJSX]; U.S. Territory Policy, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, 
https://www.mpp.org/policy/us-territories/ [https://perma.cc/PH5N-GV98]; Marijuana Deep Dive, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/bookstore/state-legislatures-
magazine/marijuana-deep-dive.aspx [https://perma.cc/KZ4U-7GSZ] [hereinafter Marijuana Deep 
Dive]; Guam Legalizes Recreational Use of Marijuana, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/90e16396f1f14e08aee3e1c9d2a8d493 [https://perma.cc/9LYW-6L6B].  The most 
recent adult use legalization state, Illinois, did so legislatively in June 2019.  John O’Connor, Illinois 
Becomes 11th State to Allow Recreational Marijuana, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.apnews.com/7b793d88f3c84417b83db0f770854960 [https://perma.cc/Y6PK-PN78]. 
 
ORENSTEIN_GLANTZ_03JUN20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2020  9:24 AM 
2020] CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 1317 
business sector is rising, complete with professional marketing firms,11 
industry-specific conferences and events,12 and industry groups actively 
lobbying for favorable legal changes.13  
Estimates for the near-term future size of the global legal cannabis market 
vary and depend heavily on assumptions of future legal changes, but some 
analysts expect the industry could grow to $75 billion in sales by 2030, 
surpassing soda, among other industries.14  The cannabis market has already 
attracted the attention and investment of major corporate entities in Canada 
(which legalized adult use in 2018), including Altria (parent company of Philip 
Morris USA, maker of Marlboro® and other cigarette labels), Constellation 
Brands (owner of Corona® and other beer labels), and Molson Coors (owner 
of Molson®, Coors®, and other beer labels), while a number of other large 
corporations, including Coca-Cola®, are reportedly also considering entry.15  
Tobacco companies in particular have contemplated entering the cannabis 
market in the event of legalization since the late 1960s.16  Public health 
advocates are justifiably concerned about such corporate entities, especially 
tobacco, entering the cannabis market, but even an independently developing 
cannabis industry poses substantial risks if it follows the path of industries like 
tobacco.  As Richter and Levy explain, “The tobacco industry has provided a 
detailed road map for marijuana: deny addiction potential, downplay known 
adverse health effects, create as large a market as possible as quickly as 
 
11. See, e.g., Marijuana Advertising Agencies, GANJAPRENEUR, 
https://www.ganjapreneur.com/marijuana-advertising-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/8F9T-MSJQ] 
(listing multiple cannabis-specific advertising agencies). 
12. Events Calendar, NAT’L CANNABIS INDUS. ASS’N, https://thecannabisindustry.org/ncia-
events/ [https://perma.cc/H253-TD2Y]. 
13. NAT’L CANNABIS INDUS. ASS’N, https://thecannabisindustry.org/ [https://perma.cc/UE6H-
ZUPD].  
14. Jeremy Berke, Coca-Cola Is Reportedly Eyeing the Legal Marijuana Industry, and It Could 
Soon Be a Bigger Market Than Soda, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/marijuana-bigger-than-soda-according-to-analyst-2018-4 
[https://perma.cc/S7LJ-YDMS]. 
15. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16 (Can.) (legalizing adult use cannabis in Canada); David Gelles, 
When the Makers of Marlboro and Corona Get Into Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/business/cannabis-business-altria-canopy-constellation-
cronos.html [https://perma.cc/2DAB-TWZ3] (detailing large corporate investments in Canadian 
cannabis companies). 
16. See generally Rachel Ann Barry, Heikki Hiilamo, & Stanton A. Glantz, Waiting for the 
Opportune Moment: The Tobacco Industry and Marijuana Legalization, 92 MILBANK Q. 207 (2014).  
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possible, and protect that market through lobbying, campaign contributions, 
and other advocacy efforts.”17 
Cannabis legalization carries ostensible social benefits, including medical 
utility for some conditions18 and the promise of ending discriminatory 
enforcement practices that have disproportionately affected vulnerable 
populations, particularly communities of color, throughout the history of 
cannabis criminalization in the United States.19  American voters have been 
receptive to these arguments and have been increasingly willing to approve 
medical and adult use legalization ballot initiatives over the past two decades.20  
Particularly for adult use cannabis, ballot initiatives have been advocates’ legal 
vehicle of choice.  Only Illinois (2019), Vermont (2018), the Northern Mariana 
Islands (2018), and Guam (2019) have enacted adult use laws legislatively; the 
other nine states and D.C. have all enacted their adult use laws via ballot 
initiative.21 
The increasing success of legalization ballot initiatives over time22 and the 
current state of U.S. public opinion on the appropriate legal status of cannabis 
(67% support nationally for legalization as of 201923) make further legalization 
 
17. Kimber P. Richter & Sharon Levy, Big Marijuana – Lessons from Big Tobacco, 371 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 399, 401 (2014). 
18. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 13–14 (summarizing conclusions 
regarding therapeutic effects of cannabis and cannabinoids). 
19. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, The Colors Of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 689, 690–702 (2016).  Notably, there continue to be troubling disparities in cannabis-related 
arrests in adult use states, which legalization opponents cite as evidence that legalization is failing to 
achieve a key outcome advanced by advocates.  Kevin Sabet, Marijuana and Legalization Impacts, 23 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 84, 92–93 (2018).  Among other factors, disparate enforcement of prohibitions 
remaining following legalization, including public consumption, youth possession, and driving under 
the influence, can contribute to continued disparities, reflecting broader inequities tied to racial 
profiling, “broken window” policing, and law enforcement saturation in neighborhoods of color.  
Bender, supra, at 701–03. 
20. Daniel G. Orenstein & Stanton A. Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass: Cannabis Legalization 
Ballot Initiative Campaign Contributions and Outcomes, 2004–2016, 45 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 
73, 87–88 (2020) [hereinafter Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass].  
21. O’Connor, supra note 10; Tom Angell, Governor Signs Marijuana Legalization Bill, Making 
History In US Territory, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/09/21/governor-signs-marijuana-legalization-bill-
making-history-in-us-territory/#676fe0827ea3 [https://perma.cc/BXA9-6L8H]; Marijuana Overview, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/marijuana-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZT7Q-LMZL] [hereinafter Marijuana Overview]. 
22. Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 76–77, 87–88. 
23. Andrew Daniller, Two-Thirds of Americans Support Marijuana Legalization, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/14/americans-support-marijuana-
legalization/ [https://perma.cc/5S89-98VF]. 
 
ORENSTEIN_GLANTZ_03JUN20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2020  9:24 AM 
2020] CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 1319 
highly likely in additional states.  From a legal and public health perspective, 
cannabis legalization has likely become more a question of “how,” rather than 
“if” in the United States.24  As additional states25 contemplate adult use 
legalization, the public health implications of this policy evolution will depend 
in part on the content of legalization laws and how well they govern the new 
legal market.  
On one side, legalization represents the potential to better regulate a 
substance that has remained commonly used despite strict federal prohibition 
and to improve public awareness of the health effects (both adverse and 
therapeutic) of use.  On the other, legalization may also increase use prevalence 
and frequency, encourage youth initiation, reproduce existing inequities for 
vulnerable populations, and lead to other social harms.  The influence of 
corporatization may exacerbate such negative effects, replicating the ills of 
tobacco and alcohol markets.  Legislative approaches to cannabis legalization 
thus present both opportunities and risks for public health. 
Public health best practice frameworks provide critical guidance on how to 
regulate cannabis effectively and minimize negative health impacts.  A public 
health approach to legalization prioritizes public health over other goals, 
including industry profits, state tax revenues, and business development, that, 
while valid bases for government action generally, may lead to detrimental 
outcomes in regulating potentially harmful substances.  A public health 
approach draws on the successes and failures of domestic and international 
regulatory frameworks for other substances, most notably tobacco and alcohol.  
However, these substantive concerns do not exist within a vacuum, but rather 
intersect with the procedural question of how a state legalizes adult use 
cannabis—i.e., ballot initiative or legislation.  To further understand this 
intersection, this Article assesses the adoption or absence of public health best 
practices in proposed legislative adult use cannabis laws. 
Part II provides background information on the history and current status 
of cannabis under U.S. federal and state law.  This Part also introduces the 
 
24. But see William A. Galston & E.J. Dionne Jr., The New Politics of Marijuana Legalization: 
Why Opinion Is Changing, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (May 29, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Dionne-Galston_NewPoliticsofMJLeg_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5LU-
TC59] (assessing support for legalization and concluding that while opposition is unlikely to return to 
prior levels, consistent trajectory of opinions should not be assumed and will depend in part on the 
effects of ongoing legalization measures). 
25. The unique complexities of cannabis legalization in tribal jurisdictions are beyond the scope 
of this Article.  See Brad A. Bartlett & Garrett L. Davey, Tribes and Cannabis: Seeking Parity with 
States and Consultation and Agreement from the U.S. Government, 64 FED. LAW. 54, 55–56 (2017); 
Katherine Florey, Budding Conflicts: Marijuana’s Impact on Unsettled Questions of Tribal–State 
Relations, 58 B.C. L. REV. 991, 991–94 (2017). 
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foundations of a public health approach to cannabis legalization based on best 
practices from tobacco and alcohol control.  Part III defines a rubric for 
evaluating proposed legislative legalization and applies this rubric to proposed 
bills from 2018–19, finding that elements of a public health approach have 
gained traction in at least some proposals.  Part IV discusses the implications 
of these findings, concluding that proactive adoption of adult use cannabis 
legalization via state legislatures could benefit public health by obviating pro-
industry, advocate-driven initiatives and preserving legislative and regulatory 
flexibility to address developing evidence and implementation challenges in the 
future. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Brief History of Cannabis Legalization in the United States 
1.  The Path to Prohibition and Back Again  
Cannabis cultivation has a long and complex history in human 
civilization.26  Cannabis was one of the earliest cultivated plants, and its 
potential medicinal properties have been documented in Western medicine 
since the 19th century (and much longer in other traditions).27  Cannabis 
appeared in the Pharmacopeia of the United States from 1851 until 1942 with 
reference to use as an analgesic, hypnotic, and anticonvulsant.28  Despite this, 
most states banned cannabis in the early 20th century, and the federal 
government followed suit in 1937.29  Much of this push toward criminalization 
in the early 1900s was rooted in racial animus toward Mexican immigrants and 
African-Americans.30  Various international drug control treaties also 
developed in the early- and mid-20th century, ultimately consolidated in the 
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.31  The Single Convention and 
 
26. See, e.g., Brian M. Blumenfeld, State Legalization of Marijuana and Our American System 
of Federalism: A Historio-Constitutional Primer, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 77, 81 (2017) (discussing 
cultivation and use dating back to fifth-century Greece and Rome). 
27. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 43. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. 
L. 99, 104–06 (2018).  While not technically a prohibition on cannabis, this was the practical effect of 
the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.  MARK K. OSBECK & HOWARD BROMBERG, MARIJUANA LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 44–45 (2017). 
31. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 
[hereinafter Single Convention]; see also DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR & MARTIN JELSMA, FIFTY YEARS 
OF THE 1961 SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS: A REINTERPRETATION 1–5 (2011), 
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subsequent amendments created a scheduling system for controlled substances 
and obligated treaty parties to criminalize possession of such drugs.32  The 
United States played a pivotal role in shaping the treaty, led by Harry J. 
Anslinger, the nation’s first commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) who had 
spearheaded cannabis criminalization in the United States.33 
Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of 1970,34 cannabis became 
one of the most highly restricted drugs under U.S. law.35  The CSA placed 
cannabis (“marihuana” in the statutory language) on Schedule I, meaning it was 
found to have: (1) high potential for abuse; (2) no currently accepted medical 
use in treatment in the United States; and (3) a lack of accepted safety for use 
under medical supervision.36  Other Schedule I drugs include a variety of 
powerful opiates and opium derivatives (e.g., heroin), hallucinogens (e.g., 
LSD), and, as of 2012, several newer synthetic street drugs, including synthetic 
cannabinoids (sometimes called “K2” or “spice”).37  Either Congress or the U.S. 
Attorney General (via the DEA and with recommendation from the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services) has authority to revise this approach; however, 
petitions for rescheduling cannabis have failed as recently as 2016,38 despite 
 
https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr12.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZP2-F6LJ].  Potential conflicts 
between state cannabis legalization and U.S. obligations under this treaty are beyond the scope of this 
Article.  See Michael Tackeff, Note, Constructing a “Creative Reading”: Will US State Cannabis 
Legislation Threaten the Fate of the International Drug Control Treaties?, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 247, 258–59 (2018). 
32. Id.  The Single Convention also charges the World Health Organization (WHO) to assess the 
dangers posed by illicit drugs.  Single Convention, supra note 31, at art. 3–4.  WHO published a report 
on cannabis in 2016, its first in 20 years.  See WHO, EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE, supra 
note 2, at v, 1.  
33. BEWLEY-TAYLOR & JELSMA, supra note 31, at 7–8. 
34. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
35. Notably, the CSA’s approach to cannabis was in some respects actually less punitive than 
the prior Boggs Act of 1951, which applied mandatory minimum sentencing for simple possession.  
OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 30, at 52. 
36. Id.  
37. Id. at 52, 79–80; Deadly Synthetic Drugs: The Need to Stay Ahead of the Poison Peddlers: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 8 (2016) (statement of Douglas C. 
Throckmorton, Deputy Director, Regulatory Programs, U.S. Food and Drug Admin.), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-07-16%20Throckmorton%20Testimony.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9PM-6MMF]. 
38. Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,767 
(Aug. 12, 2016); see also Diane Hoffman, Francis B. Palumbo, & Y. Tony Yang, Will the FDA’s 
Approval Of Epidiolex Lead To Rescheduling Marijuana?, HEALTH AFF. (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180709.904289/full/ [https://perma.cc/4Z7G-
J35W?type=image]; John Hudak & Grace Wallack, How to Reschedule Marijuana, and Why It’s 
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growing evidence that cannabis has some therapeutic utility.39  Congress did 
legalize hemp production under the 2018 Farm Bill;40 however, hemp includes 
only cannabis with minimal concentration of ∆9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, 
responsible for the “high” associated with cannabis intoxication, among other 
effects).41 
Despite the Schedule I status of cannabis, the FDA has licensed three 
medications based on cannabinoid compounds responsible for the drug’s 
effects.  Among over one hundred identified cannabinoids, two receive by far 
the most attention from both the medical community and from regulators: THC 
and cannabidiol (CBD).42  The first two FDA-approved cannabinoid 
medications used synthetic THC: dronabinol (trade name Marinol®) and 
nabilone (trade name Cesamet®), both used for chemotherapy-associated 
nausea and vomiting.43  In 2013, FDA granted investigational new drug status 
to the first medication using non-synthetic cannabinoids derived from the 
cannabis plant, a concentrated CBD oil under the trade name Epidiolex® for 
the treatment of epilepsy-related seizures.44  Because Epidiolex® is derived 
from cannabis itself, some observers see its approval as potentially triggering 
reclassification of cannabis under federal law based on FDA’s formal 
recognition of medical utility, one of the core elements of drug scheduling 
under the CSA.45 
Shortly after enactment of the CSA, several states reduced their own 
criminal penalties for cannabis possession, with eleven states enacting such 
laws in the 1970s, though this policy development then stalled until the mid-
 
Unlikely Anytime Soon, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 13, 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/02/13/how-to-reschedule-marijuana-and-why-its-
unlikely-anytime-soon/ [https://perma.cc/7EFC-Y9YR].  The DEA previously rejected petitions for 
rescheduling cannabis in 1989 (responding to a petition originally filed in 1972) and 2011 (responding 
to a petition filed in 2002).  See All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 
1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding DEA’s 1989 denial); Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 
706 F.3d 438, 439–42 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding DEA’s 2011 denial). 
39. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 85–129.  
40. Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–334, 132 Stat. 4490, 4908–09. 
41. Id.; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 51. 
42. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1 at 38 n.4, 53–55. 
43. Id. at 53–54. 
44. Id. at 54–55. 
45. See Y. Tony Yang & Jerzy P. Szaflarski, The US Food and Drug Administration’s 
Authorization of the First Cannabis-Derived Pharmaceutical: Are We Out of the Haze?, 76 JAMA 
NEUROLOGY 135, 135 (2018). 
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1990s.46  In 1996, California became the first state to legalize cannabis for 
medical use under state law, and seven other states and D.C. followed suit by 
2000.47  The next two decades saw even more sweeping changes.  By the end 
of 2018, twenty states and D.C. had decriminalized possession of small 
amounts of cannabis, fifteen states had legalized limited forms of medical 
cannabis (e.g., high-CBD, low-THC products), thirty-three states and D.C. had 
fully legalized medical cannabis, and ten states and D.C. had legalized adult 
use cannabis.48  As of July 2019, there were only four states (Idaho, Kansas, 
Nebraska, and South Dakota) with total prohibitions on cannabis under state 
law.49 
2.  Initiatives and Industry 
Most state medical and recreational cannabis laws originated as ballot 
initiatives, rather than legislation.  Of the eleven state recreational laws, all but 
Vermont’s and Illinois’s were initiatives, as were eighteen of the thirty-three 
state medical laws.50  The ballot initiative process arose from late 19th century 
Populist and early 20th century Progressive movements to circumvent the 
perceived dominance of special interests in state legislatures.51  Tobacco control 
efforts in the United States are a modern example of the overall anti-special 
interest character of initiatives.  Beginning in the 1970s, tobacco control 
advocates began using state ballot initiatives and local-level equivalents to 
adopt smoking restrictions and tobacco taxes, sidestepping the tobacco 
industry’s considerable legislative influence.52  In response, the tobacco 
industry (in partnership with other “ballot-prone” industries) monitored 
 
46. Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Jamie F. Chriqui, & Joanna King, Marijuana Decriminalization: 
What Does it Mean in the United States? 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9690, 
2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9690.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD9V-TXW9]. 
47. Marijuana Deep Dive, supra note 10. 
48. Id. 
49. See Marijuana Overview, supra note 21; State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-
marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/53NU-GJEW] [hereinafter State Medical Marijuana Laws].  
The implications of the 2018 Farm Bill’s legalization of hemp (and thus CBD derived from hemp) 
under federal law, and the myriad resulting questions about how such products are to be regulated, are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
50. See Marijuana Overview, supra note 21. 
51. John G. Matsusaka, Special Interest Influence Under Direct Versus Representative 
Democracy 1–2 (USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 18-16, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3185260 [https://perma.cc/P288-ABAQ]. 
52. Elizabeth Laposata, Allison P. Kennedy, & Stanton A. Glantz, When Tobacco Targets Direct 
Democracy, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 537, 541–46 (2014).  
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initiative activity and advocated for reforms that would make the process more 
challenging, such as increasing signature requirements, reducing signature 
gathering periods, and increasing vote requirements for tax increases.53 
Some critics of direct democracy (including ballot initiatives and 
referendums) argue that the susceptibility of electorates to campaign 
advertising allows wealthy interests to dominate the process, enabling exactly 
the type of special interest advantage the process was designed to counter.54  
The tobacco industry, for example, has adopted a tactic of attempting to defeat 
tobacco control initiatives by introducing competing “look-alike” initiatives on 
the same subject that contain fewer or weaker regulations and often incorporate 
preemption of stronger local laws.55  Overall, however, an empirical analysis of 
initiatives relating to three major industries (energy, finance, and tobacco) 
found that enacted initiatives much more often resulted in laws contrary to 
industry interests than beneficial to them.56  
Critics of cannabis legalization have also raised the claim that the initiative 
process allows outsized influence of moneyed legalization advocates, often 
based outside of the state in which the initiative is proposed, who are able to 
commit levels of funding that are difficult for opponents to counter.57  However, 
analysis of funding for legalization ballot initiatives from 2004–2016 found that 
industry funding involvement was low in most states (with some exceptions).58  
While the money raised by advocates is substantial and typically considerably 
higher than that raised by opponents,59 changing public opinion over time may 
better explain the increasing success of initiatives, though the two are likely 
related.60  At the same time, there has been an increase in cannabis industry 
contributions to initiatives, particularly in the 2015–2016 election cycles, which 
 
53. Id. at 541–42, 545–46. 
54. See Matsusaka, supra note 51, at 2–3 (discussing competing views). 
55. See Gregory J. Tung, Yogi H. Hendlin, & Stanton A. Glantz, Competing Initiatives: A New 
Tobacco Industry Strategy to Oppose Statewide Clean Indoor Air Ballot Measures, 99 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 430, 430–32 (2009). 
56. Matsusaka, supra note 51, at 11–17. 
57. See SUE RUSCHE, NAT’L FAMILIES IN ACTION, TRACKING THE MONEY THAT’S LEGALIZING 
MARIJUANA AND WHY IT MATTERS passim (2017), 
https://www.nationalfamilies.org/assets/pdfs/Tracking_the_Money_Thats_Legalizing_Marijuana_an
d_Why_It_Matters_FINAL-R_3.15.2017-R.pdf [https://perma.cc/G37H-S4KF]. 
58. Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 82, 87–90, 104. 
59. Id. at 78 (reporting mean advocate contributions of $4.3 million compared to $1.2 million 
for opponents and median $1.7 million for advocates compared to $300,000 for opponents).  Total 
advocate contributions from 2004–2016 exceeded opponent contributions by over $100 million ($139 
million to $37.3 million).  Id. at 77–78. 
60. Id. at 87–89. 
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could indicate an emerging trend toward increased industry involvement in the 
process.61  Overall, the current relationship between the cannabis industry and 
the ballot box appears to differ from that of other industries, insomuch as the 
cannabis industry is primarily a beneficiary rather than a target of initiatives 
and has in many cases played only an indirect role in the process. 
3.  Existing State Frameworks 
As of July 2019, successful recreational cannabis initiatives had developed 
exclusively in the context of existing medical legalization frameworks.  All 
eleven recreational cannabis states had previously adopted medical laws, most 
by ballot initiative.62  Kilmer and MacCoun argue that medical legalization 
eases later passage of recreational laws by: (1) demonstrating the efficacy of 
voter initiatives in this policy area; (2) enabling changes in public perception 
that destabilize the War on Drugs; (3) increasing the evidence base to counter 
concerns regarding the effects of legalization; (4) creating “a visible and active 
marijuana industry”; and (5) showing that the federal government will not 
prevent state and local jurisdictions from collecting cannabis tax revenues.63  
Legalization opponents agree that medical cannabis laws facilitate later 
recreational laws, sometimes claiming that medical laws are mere pretext for 
recreational use or legalization.64 
In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize adult 
use cannabis, followed by Alaska and Oregon in 2014, California, Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Maine in 2016, Michigan and Vermont in 2018, and Illinois 
in 2019.65  
Vermont’s law is unique among this group in two respects.  First, it was the 
first to pass legalization legislatively.66  Second, while Vermont’s law made 
cannabis possession legal as of its effective date (July 1, 2018), it left 
legalization and oversight of legal sales for a later date.67  As of July 2019, the 
legislature had not passed a sales measure,68 and multiple Vermont bills are 
included in this analysis.  Vermont’s current law is more an extension of 
 
61. Id. at 89–90. 
62. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49.   
63. Beau Kilmer & Robert J. MacCoun, How Medical Marijuana Smoothed the Transition to 
Marijuana Legalization in the United States, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 181, 192–97 (2017). 
64. RUSCHE, supra note 57. 
65. Marijuana Deep Dive, supra note 10.  
66. Id. 
67. Id.  
68. State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49. 
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decriminalization (eliminating not only criminal, but also civil penalties), rather 
than full legalization as more commonly understood.69 
Implementation delays and political conflicts between industry, local 
government, and state government have been common in several states that 
have legalized adult use.70  Due to these delays and the recentness of most of 
the initiatives, there are limited comprehensive analyses of these laws.  The 
most in-depth of these assesses the legal frameworks in Colorado, Washington, 
Oregon, and Alaska, ultimately concluding that these states incorporated 
approximately one-third to one-half of identified public health best practices 
into their cannabis regulatory structures.71 
The lack of public health-oriented approaches in these laws likely reflects 
their origins.  Advocates who advanced these initiatives consciously adopted 
the framing of alcohol policy as an effective political tool, “urging voters to 
‘regulate marijuana like alcohol.’”72  This framing was an evolution in approach 
 
69. The legalization law in effect in D.C. similarly allows for possession, but not sales, in part 
due to restrictions imposed by Congress.  Petula Dvorak, Monuments, Museums, Marijuana: Take a 
Whiff of D.C.’s New Pot-Infused Tourism, WASH. POST (April 22, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/monuments-museums-marijuana-take-a-whiff-of-dcs-new-
pot-infused-tourism/2019/04/22/df7376e0-6500-11e9-a1b6-b29b90efa879_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/5R5X-J6SQ].  A popular work-around to the law in D.C. sees cannabis provided as 
a “gift” with the purchase of some other item at a wildly inflated price (e.g., artwork, baked goods).  
Id. 
70. This is particularly true of Maine, which only lifted a moratorium on implementation of key 
portions of its 2016 law in 2018 (and then only by overriding a gubernatorial veto).  Recreational 
Marijuana in Maine, MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE 
https://legislature.maine.gov/lawlibrary/recreational_marijuana_in_maine/9419 
[https://perma.cc/QTB7-U9KC]; see also Patrick McGreevy, California’s Black Market for Pot Is 
Stifling Legal Sales. Now the Governor Wants to Step Up Enforcement, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gavin-newsom-crackdown-pot-black-market-20190219-
story.html [https://perma.cc/R5FQ-KP3Q] (discussing conflicts in California); Michael R. Blood, 25 
Local Governments Sue over California Marijuana Delivery, ASSOCIATED PRESS (April 5, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/503266a7da114efa8e3cfc4437c8f1d7 [https://perma.cc/8WDH-9ZST] 
(discussing local governments’ legal challenge to a state regulation that would prevent them from 
prohibiting cannabis delivery within their borders). 
71. Rachel A. Barry & Stanton A. Glantz, Marijuana Regulatory Frameworks in Four US States: 
An Analysis Against a Public Health Standard, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 914, 914–15 (2018) 
[hereinafter Barry & Glantz, Four US States]; see also infra note 154–158 and accompanying text 
(discussing specific standards in the analysis more fully). 
72. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Marijuana Push in Colorado Likens It to Alcohol, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
26, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/us/a-ballot-push-to-legalize-marijuana-with-alcohol-
as-the-role-model.html [https://perma.cc/GQC9-BL6Z]; Matt Ferner, Why Marijuana Should Be 
Legalized: "Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol" Campaign Discusses Why Pot Prohibition Has Been A 
Failure, HUFFPOST (Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-marijuana-should-be-
legalized_n_1833751 [https://perma.cc/ET3X-QY8X]. 
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by advocates, who moved away from arguments based primarily on personal 
freedom to also include those emphasizing tax revenue, social justice, and the 
differences in legal treatment of alcohol (an intoxicating substance that is 
widely available and lightly regulated) and cannabis (an intoxicating substance 
that is criminalized).73  This line of argument appears to have resonated with 
voters, as these newly-branded legalization initiatives were substantially more 
successful than earlier efforts.74  Given this framing, it is not surprising that the 
statutes enacted by the initiatives and the regulations that followed generally 
accord with alcohol policy.75  Unfortunately, U.S. alcohol control laws 
frequently fail to reflect public health best practices, particularly with regard to 
preventing underage use and heavy consumption.76  As a result, “regulating 
marijuana like alcohol” has meant a pro-business approach that is not designed 
to reduce use. 
Based on electoral results and public opinion surveys, momentum currently 
appears to favor legalization generally.77  The exact parameters of a new legal 
framework for cannabis, however, may not yet be established.  One of the most 
pressing questions in the coming years will be whether legislatures can better 
incorporate public health goals into legalization laws compared to the 
approaches offered to date by advocates via the initiative process. 
B.  The Public Health Approach 
A public health approach to cannabis legalization prioritizes public health 
over other policy goals.  This Article leverages the successes and failures of 
domestic and international approaches to other substances, most notably 
tobacco and alcohol, to outline a rubric for evaluation of public health best 
practices for cannabis regulation.  To do so, it draws on several key resources, 
including reports and policy statements by governmental entities and non-
governmental health organizations, international agreements, and health policy 
scholarship, to define the public health approach. 
 
73. Ferner, supra note 72; Molly Ball, Will Colorado Legalize Pot?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/will-colorado-legalize-pot/263355/ 
[https://perma.cc/E7GC-2XKK]. 
74. See Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 76–77 (detailing results 
of legalization initiatives over time).  
75. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 915. 
76. John T. Carnevale, Raanan Kagan, Patrick J. Murphy, & Josh Esrick, A Practical Framework 
for Regulating For-Profit Recreational Marijuana in US States: Lessons from Colorado and 
Washington, 42 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 71, 80 (2017); see also Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra 
note 71, at 919. 
77. See Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 91–93.  
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1.  Existing Models: Health Policy Organizations and International 
Agreements 
a.  American Public Health Association 
The American Public Health Association (APHA) released a policy 
statement in 2014 focused on prioritization of public health in the regulation of 
commercial cannabis.78  APHA has similar policy statements relating to 
alcohol, tobacco, and substance use, as well as a prior statement on cannabis 
(but not legalization specifically).79  Drawing from both tobacco and alcohol 
control, APHA lists five broad areas of concern to public health in cannabis 
legalization: (1) increased availability; (2) passive exposures; (3) quality 
control and consumer protection; (4) motor vehicle safety; and (5) health 
effects.80 
APHA proposes general strategies and action steps, for the most part 
without suggesting a specific standard.  Based on alcohol control policy, APHA 
calls for: (1) retailer liability for injuries to others (i.e., dram shop liability for 
overservice); (2) impaired driving enforcement; and (3) high minimum 
purchase age standards (generally supporting a minimum age of 21).81  Based 
on tobacco control policy, APHA recommends: (4) warning labels; (5) 
secondhand exposure measures (e.g., public location bans, restrictions on use 
in multi-unit housing); and (6) cultivation worker protections.  Drawing from 
both alcohol and tobacco control, APHA recommends: (7) taxation at levels 
sufficient to price minors out of the market and reduce access; (8) limits on the 
days and times of retail operation; (9) restrictions on outlet locations and 
geographic density; (10) constraints on advertising aimed at adolescents, 
children, communities of color, and groups of low socioeconomic status; and 
(11) continuing monitoring of regulatory interventions.  APHA also calls for 
support and funding for health effects research; use of cannabis tax revenue to 
cover regulatory costs and to fund prevention, treatment, and research; and 
“development and availability of linguistically competent educational and 
informational materials for individuals with limited English proficiency.”82 
 
78. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, REGULATING COMMERCIALLY LEGALIZED MARIJUANA AS A 
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b.  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC)83 and its implementing guidelines,84 while not 
designed specifically for cannabis regulation, are a key touchstone for the 
modern evidence-based public health approach to product regulation and thus 
carry significant weight as a model for regulating cannabis.  The FCTC is a 
widely adopted health treaty with 181 parties that sets the global standard for 
tobacco control, combining price and tax measures to reduce product demand, 
non-price strategies to reduce demand, and supply reduction interventions.85 
FCTC Article 8 targets protection from secondhand/environmental tobacco 
smoke,86 adopting as a fundamental principle that “[a]ll people should be 
protected from exposure to tobacco smoke[, and a]ll indoor workplaces and 
indoor public places should be [smokefree].”87  The Implementing Guidelines 
clarify that any measures short of total elimination of smoking in a space or 
environment (e.g., ventilation, filtration) are ineffective and insufficient.88  
Given the similarities between tobacco smoke and cannabis smoke,89 this 
approach strongly resonates for cannabis regulation.90 
 
83. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 
[hereinafter WHO FCTC] (2005), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42811/1/9241591013.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/C946-
5UJC]. 
84. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL: 
GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION [hereinafter WHO FCTC GUIDELINES] (2013), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/80510/9789241505185_eng.pdf?sequence=1 
[https://perma.cc/D6K9-T2PX]. 
85. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Feb. 27, 2005, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166.  
While the United States is not a Party to the FCTC, U.S. law has incorporated several elements of the 
treaty, primarily via the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 
123 Stat. 1776 (2009). 
86. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 8. 
87. WHO FCTC GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at 21. 
88. Id. at 20. 
89. See David Moir, William S. Rickert, Genevieve Levasseur, Yolande Larose, Rebecca 
Maertens, Paul White, & Suzanne Desjardins, A Comparison of Mainstream and Sidestream 
Marijuana and Tobacco Cigarette Smoke Produced under Two Machine Smoking Conditions, 21 
CHEMICAL RES. TOXICOLOGY 494, 494 (2008). 
90. Additionally, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning 
Engineers (ASHRAE), which publishes a highly influential set of ventilation standards for indoor air 
quality, revised its definition of “environmental tobacco smoke” in 2016 to include both electronic 
smoking devices and cannabis smoke.  STANDARDS FOR VENTILATION FOR ACCEPTABLE INDOOR AIR 
QUALITY 62.1 (amended 2019) (AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST. & AM. SOC'Y OF HEATING, 
REFRIGERATING, & AIR-CONDITIONING ENG'RS 2016), https://www.ashrae.org/technical-
resources/bookstore/standards-62-1-62-2 [https://perma.cc/6G7F-TFR3]; see also S. Aguinaga 
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Article 9 deals with regulation of product contents.91  The Implementing 
Guidelines specifically note that “[f]rom the perspective of public health, there 
is no justification for permitting the use of ingredients, such as flavouring 
agents, which help make tobacco products attractive.”92  The same can be said 
for additives in cannabis products intended to stimulate use or to attract youth 
or vulnerable populations. 
Article 11 addresses packaging and labeling and obligates Parties to ensure 
that these elements are not “false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an 
erroneous impression” about a product or its health effects.93  Article 11 also 
requires health warnings for all products to be rotating, large, and clearly 
visible, to cover at least 30% (ideally at least 50%) of the product’s principal 
display area, and to include pictorial elements.94  The Implementing Guidelines 
further encourage plain packaging requirements, which prohibit all branding 
elements other than brand and product names in a standardized color and font 
specified by the government that apply to all covered tobacco products.95 
Article 13 calls for a “comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship,” as consistent with applicable constitutional principles.96  To the 
extent a comprehensive ban is not possible, Article 13 obligates Parties to 
prohibit marketing that is false or misleading, require warnings on all 
advertisements, restrict the use of incentives, require disclosure of advertising 
expenditures, restrict or ban advertising using mass media, and restrict or 
prohibit industry sponsorship of event and activities.97 
Article 16 addresses sales to and by minors (age 18 or as set by relevant 
law) by requiring age verification, banning self-service product displays, 
prohibiting other products (e.g., sweets) in the form of tobacco products, 
 
Bialous & Stanton A. Glantz, ASHRAE Standard 62: Tobacco Industry’s Influence over National 
Ventilation Standards, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 315, 316 (2002) (describing the importance of 
ASHRAE standards and the tobacco industry’s efforts to influence them). 
91. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 9. 
92. WHO FCTC GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at 33. 
93. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 9–10. 
94. Id. 
95. WHO FCTC GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at 63. 
96. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 11.  The Guidelines’ major caveat for constitutional 
commercial speech protections was the result of U.S. demands, Contemporary Practice of the United 
States Relating to International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 681, 689–90 (2003), though the United States 
remains one of the few WHO members that is not a Party to the treaty, WHO Member States (by 
Regions) that Are NOT Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., [hereinafter WHO Member States Not Party to FCTC] 
https://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/non_parties/en/ [https://perma.cc/PH74-ER2V]. 
97. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 11–12. 
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limiting vending machine access to age-restricted areas, prohibiting free 
product giveaways, and prohibiting sale of small-quantity products that 
increase affordability.98 
Other FCTC provisions call for price and tax measures to reduce 
consumption,99 effective public education campaigns,100 demand-reduction 
measures focused on treatment and cessation,101 reduction of illicit trade,102 
support for alternative commercial activities for industry-dependent workers,103 
and protection of the environment and the health of cultivation workers,104 all 
of which have relevance to cannabis regulation. 
c.  CDC Task Force on Community Preventive Services 
Using an evidence-based approach that considers both efficacy and cost-
effectiveness, the CDC Task Force on Community Preventive Services 
recommends interventions to improve health across various policy areas, 
including both tobacco and alcohol.105  To reduce tobacco initiation, use, and 
secondhand exposure, the Task Force recommends: (1) comprehensive tobacco 
control programs; (2) increasing unit price; (3) implementing mass-reach health 
communication interventions; (4) adopting smokefree policies; and (5) 
mobilizing the community with additional interventions. 106 
To reduce and prevent excess alcohol consumption, the Task Force 
recommends: (1) dram shop liability; (2) electronic screening and brief 
interventions; (3) increasing taxes; (4) limits on days and hours of sale; (5) 
regulation of outlet density; and (6) enhanced enforcement of laws prohibiting 
sales to minors.107  The Task Force also recommends against privatization of 
retail sales.108 
 
98. Id. at 15–16. 
99. Id. at 7. 
100. Id. at 10–11. 
101. Id. at 13. 
102. Id. at 13–15. 
103. Id. at 16. 
104. Id.  




107. CPSTF Findings for Excessive Alcohol Consumption, CMTY. GUIDE, 
https://www.thecommunityguide.org/content/task-force-findings-excessive-alcohol-consumption 
[https://perma.cc/HHL3-TJJ7]. 
108. Id.   
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d.  Healthy People 2020 
Managed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Healthy 
People is a collaborative initiative that sets national 10-year goals and 
measurable objectives to improve health and well-being of people and 
communities.109  The Healthy People 2020 leading health indicators for 
substance abuse and tobacco are, collectively: adolescent use in past thirty days, 
adult cigarette smoking, and adult binge drinking in the past month.110  The 
same issues—adolescent use, use of inhaled or smoked products, and excessive 
or binge use—are among the most critical regulatory targets for cannabis.  
While framed as goals rather than specific policy prescriptions, the Healthy 
People 2020 objectives are highly relevant in assessing the design of cannabis 
laws and include several implicit policy recommendations.  For example, the 
goal of eliminating laws that preempt local control111 implies a recommendation 
to include non-preemption in newly created laws. 
Relevant Healthy People 2020 substance use objectives include: (1) 
reducing youth use; (2) increasing youth disapproval of use and perception of 
risk; (3) reducing binge use; and (4) decreasing impaired driving fatalities.112 
Similarly, objectives for tobacco use include: (1) reducing use by adults and 
adolescents; (2) reducing initiation among children, adolescents, and young 
adults; (3) reducing the proportion of nonsmokers exposed to secondhand 
smoke; (4) increasing proportion of persons covered by indoor worksite 
policies that prohibit smoking; (5) establishing smokefree laws that prohibit 
smoking in public places and worksites; (6) eliminating state laws that preempt 
stronger local tobacco control laws; (7) increasing product taxes; (8) reducing 
proportion of adolescents and young adults exposed to product marketing; and 
(9) reducing illegal sales to minors by enforcing prohibitions on such sales.113 
 
109. About Healthy People, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, 
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/About-Healthy-People [https://perma.cc/QZZ2-UZGH]. 
110. 2020 Topics & Objectives: Substance Use, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, 
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/substance-abuse/objectives 
[https://perma.cc/6ZRB-XCFB] [hereinafter HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Substance Use]; 2020 Topics & 
Objectives: Tobacco Use, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-
objectives/topic/tobacco-use/objectives [https://perma.cc/4EMT-5GVF] [hereinafter 
HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Tobacco Use]. 
111. HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Tobacco Use, supra note 110. 
112. HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Substance Use, supra note 110. 
113. HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Tobacco Use, supra note 110. 
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2.  Existing Models: Health Policy Scholarship 
While there has been meaningful scholarship about cannabis 
criminalization and the potential for other regulatory alternatives for some 
time,114 health policy scholarship focused on how to regulate legal cannabis 
from a public health perspective developed in earnest after passage of Colorado 
and Washington’s 2012 initiatives to legalize adult use.115  
In particular, much of the substantive scholarship in this area has been 
produced by researchers in the RAND Corporation’s Drug Policy Research 
Center.116  In a 2014 analysis, a group of RAND scholars proposed a cannabis-
specific policy framework based on tobacco and alcohol control that centers on 
five policy objectives designed to minimize youth access and use, drugged 
driving, dependency and addiction, consumption of products with unwanted 
contaminants or uncertain potency, and concurrent use of cannabis and alcohol 
(particularly in public).117  Toward this end, they recommend: (1) artificially 
high prices via taxation and enforcement; (2) a state monopoly on production, 
distribution, and/or sale; (3) restriction of licenses and monitoring of licensees; 
(4) limiting types of products sold, including additives, flavorings, and 
cannabinoid content; (5) restrictions on marketing to the extent possible under 
US law, including plain packaging requirements; (6) limiting public 
 
114. See, e.g., ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM 
OTHER VICES, TIMES, & PLACES 1–14 (2001). 
115. See e.g., Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 71–73; AM. PUB. HEALTH 
ASS’N, supra note 78; Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Beau Kilmer, Alexander C. Wagenaar, Frank J. 
Chaloupka, & Jonathan P. Caulkins, Developing Public Health Regulations for Marijuana: Lessons 
from Alcohol and Tobacco, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1021, 1021 (2014); Beau Kilmer, Policy Designs 
for Cannabis Legalization: Starting with the Eight Ps, 40 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 259, 259–
61 (2014) [hereinafter Kilmer, Eight P’s]; Rachel Ann Barry & Stanton Glantz, A Public Health 
Framework for Legalized Retail Marijuana Based on the US Experience: Avoiding a New Tobacco 
Industry, 13 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (2016) [hereinafter Barry & Glantz, Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry]. 
116. See, e.g., MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 114, at xv–xvi; JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, BEAU 
KILMER, MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, ROBERT J. MACCOUN, GREGORY MIDGETTE, PAT OGLESBY, 
ROSALIE LICCARDO PACULA, & PETER H. REUTER, RAND CORP., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS iii (2015), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR864.readonline.html [https://perma.cc/UX8H-
MDJQ]; Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1021, 1027; Kilmer, 
Eight Ps, supra note 115, at 259; Beau Kilmer, The “10 P’s” of Marijuana Legalization, BERKELEY 
REV. LATIN AM. STUD., Spring 2015, at 52, 52 [hereinafter Kilmer, 10 P's]; Jonathan P. Caulkins, 
Carolyn C. Coulson, Christina Farber, & Joseph V. Vesely, Marijuana Legalization: Certainty, 
Impossibility, Both, or Neither?, 5 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2012); see also RAND Drug Policy 
Research Center: Center Staff, RAND CORP., https://www.rand.org/well-being/justice-
policy/centers/dprc/about/staff.html [https://perma.cc/E3PB-FSAC] (listing RAND affiliates). 
117. Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1022. 
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consumption; (7) measuring and preventing impaired driving, and (8) a 
comprehensive product tracking system.118 
Two other RAND-affiliated papers present slates of key policy choices for 
state legalization without making specific recommendations.  In one, Kilmer 
emphasizes that “legalization is not a binary choice”119 and suggests a set of ten 
policy choices (stylized as the “10 Ps”):  
• Production: the number of producers and amount of 
production to be allowed, locations where production will 
be allowed, and types of products to be allowed on the 
market; 
• Profit motive: whether to allow profit-maximizing firms to 
enter the market or to restrict the market to nonprofit 
organizations, “for-benefit corporations,” or a state-run 
monopoly; 
• Promotion: whether to allow advertising; 
• Prevention: whether to devote resources to prevention 
efforts, including youth prevention, and how to fund such 
efforts; 
• Policing and enforcement: how much time and effort to 
devote to enforcement of remaining prohibitions (e.g., on 
public consumption) and how to address remain black 
market cannabis producers and distributors; 
• Penalties: how to sanction noncompliance, including 
license revocation, civil penalties, and criminal penalties; 
• Potency: whether to limit THC content or other 
cannabinoids; 
• Purity: whether and how to regulate mold, pesticides, and 
other contaminants, and whether to allow alcohol- or 
nicotine-infused cannabis products on the market; 
• Price: how to shape cannabis price, including through 
license fees, regulations, and taxes; and  
• Permanency: how much regulatory flexibility to 
incorporate into legal frameworks, such as creating 
independent commissions or including sunset provisions, 
to address changing evidence and new products.120 
In the other, a RAND report generated in connection with Vermont’s 
consideration of legalization policy options, the authors similarly provide a 
 
118. Id. at 1022–26. 
119. Kilmer, 10 P’s, supra note 116, at 53. 
120. Id. at 53–57. 
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“regulatory checklist” in eight categories: (1) types of products allowed; (2) 
cannabinoid content; (3) retail outlets and delivery; (4) sales to nonresidents; 
(5) pricing controls; (6) prevention and countermarketing; (7) vertical 
integration; and (8) local autonomy.121  The authors emphasize the importance 
of careful consideration of policy alternatives in cannabis regulation and the 
necessity of thinking beyond alcohol control models: 
A jurisdiction considering something other than marijuana 
prohibition needs to encourage serious conversations about 
each of these choices.  Marijuana is a very different commodity 
from other regulated goods (even alcohol) and early-adopting 
states simply cannot use cookie–cutter regulations for alcohol 
to cover all of the important choices.122 
Writing in an international context on behalf of the Transform Drug Policy 
Foundation for a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 
the World Drug Problem, Rolles and Murkin make recommendations across 
production, price, tax, consumption methods, potency, packaging, retailer 
regulation, consumer regulation, retail outlets, and marketing.123  The authors 
make several of the same recommendations and also add several specific 
elements, including: separation of ownership between production and retail 
entities;124 restriction of home growth based on age and production capacity;125 
price controls;126 taxation at both production and sales tiers based on THC 
content by weight;127 mandatory opaque, resealable, and child-resistant plastic 
containers;128 on-package messaging modelled on pharmaceuticals and tobacco 
products;129 escalating penalties for noncompliance, including license 
revocation;130 restrictions on retailer locations near age-sensitive areas and 
 
121. CAULKINS, KILMER, KLEIMAN, MACCOUN, MIDGETTE, OGLESBY, PACULA, & REUTER, 
supra note 116, at 106–12. 
122. Id. at 112–13. 
123. STEVE ROLLES & GEORGE MURKIN, TRANSFORM DRUG POLICY FOUND., HOW TO 
REGULATE CANNABIS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE  passim (2014), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/Contributions/Civil/Transform-Drug-Policy-
Foundation/How-to-Regulate-Cannabis-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/5247-94J5]. 
124. See id. at 50; Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1022–
26.  
125. ROLLES & MURKIN, supra note 123, at 51. 
126. Id. at 72–74. 
127. Id. at 84. 
128. Id. at 118. 
129. Id.  
130. Id. at 126. 
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prohibition of sales of non-cannabis products;131 and a total ban on all forms of 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship based on WHO FCTC Article 13.132  
The authors also make several policy recommendations that less frequently 
appear in (or even contradict) other sources, including: promoting small-scale 
social clubs; 133 avoiding directing revenue on a sales basis to drug treatment, 
prevention, or other social programs to prevent dependence on cannabis sales 
revenue;134 and encouraging non-smoked consumption methods, including 
vaporized products (contingent on additional research).135  
Based explicitly on alcohol control policy lessons, Mosher recommends 
policies targeting social availability, commercial availability, taxation and 
price, driving under the influence, advertising, and market structure.136  Among 
the specific proposals that stand out from other frameworks are application of 
civil liability to social hosts who provide cannabis to minors at home and to 
commercial sellers/retailers (i.e., dram shop liability); mandatory training for 
servers and sellers; restrictions on outlet density; restrictions on home delivery; 
a prohibition on price promotions; zero tolerance laws for youth driving under 
the influence; permitting advertising in electronic media only when less than 
15% of the audience is under 21; a government-controlled or non-profit market 
structure; limits on the number of licenses in each license tier and restrictions 
on production or volume per license; restrictions on vertical integration; 
prohibition of volume discounts between license tiers; and minimum price 
markups at the wholesale and retail levels.137 
Leveraging lessons learned from the specific experiences of Colorado and 
Washington, the first two states to legalize adult use, Carnevale, Kagan, 
Murphy, and Esrick offer policy proposals in five areas: “cultivation, 
production, and processing; sales, consumption, and possession; taxes and 
finance; public health and safety; and governance.”138  Notably, the authors 
 
131. Id. at 142–43. 
132. Id. at 150. 
133. Id. at 50. 
134. Id. at 85.  The authors instead recommend funding such programs should be funded based 
on need.  
135. Id. at 91–93. 
136. JAMES F. MOSHER, VENTURA CTY. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, THE 2016 CALIFORNIA 
MARIJUANA INITIATIVE AND YOUTH: LESSONS FROM ALCOHOL POLICY 4 (2016), 
http://venturacountylimits.org/resource_documents/VC-MJ-AUMA-FNL-REV2-web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PBS5-ZL6Y]. 
137. Id. at 15–21. 
138. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 74. 
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explicitly adopt “practicality”139 as their primary touchstone, rather than 
theoretically ideal policy.140  As a result, there are several public health-oriented 
policies they note would be desirable, but do not recommend because they 
judge them to be impractical,141 including plain packaging,142 minimum unit 
pricing,143 and non-commercial or not-for-profit market structure.144 
Owing to the emphasis on practicality and likelihood of adoption, 
Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, and Esrick recommend a more limited, but still 
important, suite of policies.145  Those that add to previously cited proposals 
include: 
• Restricting use to those 21 years and older with significant 
penalties for sales to minors;146 
• Maximum limit on sales quantity per person or 
transaction;147  
• Unitary recreational and medical regulatory system;148 
• Taxes designed to keep prices artificially high without 
fueling the illicit market;149 
• Robust data collection and performance monitoring;150 and 
• Restrictions on industry involvement in the regulatory 
process based on alcohol and tobacco control.151  
The authors supplement these specific recommendations within an 
overarching emphasis on regulatory flexibility, viewing as paramount the 
ability of government to adjust to new data, new products, and other 
 
139. The authors’ approach to practicality relies on a judgment of “what [the authors] believe 
are the practically viable legalization regimes likely to occur in US states under current circumstances 
and law. . . . begin[ning] with the approach that [they] judge most likely to be implemented.”  Id. at 
72.  As part of this judgment, the authors include “US culture, the parties at work in the legalization 
movement, existing federal law and federal guidance . . . and the experience of states that have 
legalized.”  Id.  
140. Id.  
141. Id. at 72, 78. 
142. Id. at 78. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 72. 
145. Id. at 74. 
146. Id. at 77. 
147. Id.  The authors do not recommend a specific limit, but do note a 1-ounce limit in multiple 
states.  Id. 
148. Id. at 82. 
149. Id. at 78. 
150. Id. at 83. 
151. Id. at 81. 
 
ORENSTEIN_GLANTZ_03JUN20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2020  9:24 AM 
1338 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:1313 
developments.152  They also aptly describe a key difference between existing 
regulatory approaches to tobacco and alcohol that is especially relevant to 
cannabis policy decisions: 
[E]ven a brief examination of the US alcohol and tobacco 
industries illustrates how regulatory goals can affect markets, 
even within commercialized, for-profit models that share much 
in common.  US alcohol and tobacco systems look quite similar 
at first blush; yet, alcohol regulations seek to limit use in 
specific circumstances (e.g., by youth or by adults at work, in 
public, or while driving) but do not seek to discourage use—
that is, they do not attempt to reduce the size of the market.  In 
contrast, current US tobacco regulations actively seek to 
reduce the size of the industry . . . .153 
Barry and Glantz provide a detailed framework for assessing adult use 
cannabis laws based on a survey of public health best practices from tobacco 
control, arguing that alcohol control models are typically inadequate to protect 
public health.154  They offer a 30-point assessment across eleven policy areas,155 
expanded in a subsequent paper to a 67-point framework across sixteen policy 
areas.156  Some of the included policy prescriptions are quite detailed and thus 
better suited to evaluating regulations than legislation,157 but the most critical 
elements they recommend that have not already been discussed include: 
• State health department as lead regulatory agency; 
• Creation of advisory groups that have expertise in cannabis 
prevention and control with strict conflict of interest 
prohibitions and a prohibition on industry participation; 
• Licensure fees that cover costs of administration and 
enforcement; 
• Frequent, routine, and unannounced compliance checks 
with dedicated revenue; 
• Prohibition on point-of-sale displays, with all products 
sold behind the counter; 
• Prohibition on electronic commerce (e.g., sales via text 
message or social media); 
• Prohibition on use of cartoon characters or imagery 
encouraging use or consumption; 
 
152. Id. at 71, 75–76, 81, 83. 
153. Id. at 74. 
154. Barry & Glantz, Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry, supra note 115, at 2–3. 
155. Id. at 4. 
156. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 914; id. at tbl. A (Supp. 2018).  
157. The authors created the framework to apply to the collective body of state law regulating 
cannabis, including initiatives, bills, executive orders, and administrative rules.  Id. at 914–15.  
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• Prohibition on brand stretching or sharing; 
• Prohibition on product placements or paid popular media 
promotions; 
• Dedicated revenue for enforcement, prevention and 
control, and research; 
• Smokefree laws that prohibit cannabis use where tobacco 
use is prohibited; 
• Non-preemption of local smoking restrictions, licensing, 
and retail sales environment control; 
• Prohibition on additives that are toxic or injurious (e.g., 
nicotine), enhance color or palatability (e.g., menthol), 
imply a health benefit (e.g., vitamins), or are associated 
with energy and vitality (e.g., caffeine); and 
• Government approval of all packaging and labeling.158 
Cannabis regulation is a complex and multifaceted area that intersects with 
numerous areas of law (e.g., land use, insurance, professional regulation), but 
this Article concerns itself exclusively with measures directly relating to 
protecting public health.  Even with multiple public health frameworks to draw 
from, there remain several important health issues beyond the scope of this 
Article.  These include, among others, equity and social justice programs to 
ameliorate impacts of the War on Drugs,159 restrictions on pesticide use and 
other elements of cultivation,160 comprehensive product testing requirements,161 
cannabis worker protections,162 constraints on actual or apparent conflicts of 
interest among state and local government employees and law enforcement 
personnel,163 and protections for employees and renters against discrimination 
 
158. Id. at 914; id. at tbl.A (Supp. 2018).  
159. Such provisions include those addressing, among other issues, expungement of prior 
criminal convictions for cannabis possession, limitation of criminal consequences for cannabis 
possession by minors, and provision of targeted funding to community reinvestment for populations 
disproportionately affected by cannabis criminalization.  See, e.g., Bender, supra note 19, at 702, 705–
06. 
160. See, e.g., Nate Seltenrich, Into the Weeds: Regulating Pesticides in Cannabis, ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, Apr. 2019, at 1, 1–3. 
161. See, e.g., Todd Subritzky, Simone Pettigrew, & Simon Lenton, Issues in the Implementation 
and Evolution of the Commercial Recreational Cannabis Market in Colorado, 27 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 
1, 6–7 (2016). 
162. See generally Kevin M. Walters, Gwenith G. Fisher, & Liliana Tenney, An Overview of 
Health and Safety in the Colorado Cannabis Industry, 61 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 451 (2018). 
163. See generally Candice M. Bowling & Stanton A. Glantz, Conflict of Interest Provisions in 
State Laws Governing Medical and Adult Use Cannabis, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 423 (2019). 
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for cannabis use.164  While this Article focuses on specific provisions common 
across multiple public health best practice models for tobacco, alcohol, and 
cannabis regulation, such other legal elements also have clear ties to health and 
should receive due consideration and analysis. 
This Article also focuses on state law.  As such, it does not address cannabis 
regulation at the federal level or the interaction of cannabis regulation and 
federalism.  Should the federal government alter its approach to cannabis, this 
would certainly have substantial implications for state laws; however, the 
public health approach outlined here (and advanced by others) would also apply 
to a potential federal legalization framework.  Cannabis regulation on sovereign 
tribal lands and conflict with international treaty obligations are also beyond 
the scope of this Article, though emerging cannabis legalization frameworks in 
Canada165 and Uruguay166 are likely to establish a path forward in one or both 
of these areas. 
III.  PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH RUBRIC FOR LEGISLATIVE ADULT USE 
CANNABIS LEGALIZATION 
Based on the foundational frameworks discussed in Part II, this Part applies 
a consolidated set of sixteen core public health elements common across 
existing recommendations and best practice compilations that are suitable for 
 
164. See, e.g., Connor P. Burns, Note, I Was Gonna Get a Job, But Then I Got High: An 
Examination of Cannabis and Employment in the Post-Barbuto Regime, 99 B.U. L. REV. 643 (2019); 
Jinouth Vasquez Santos, Pot-Protective Employment Laws Loom in 2019, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2018, at 
12, 12; Bender, supra note 19, at 703–04; Bruce D. Stout & Bennett A. Barlyn, The Human and Fiscal 
Toll of America’s Drug War: One State’s Experience, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 525, 534, 557, 560 (2013) 
(noting public housing exclusion for drug offenders).  
165. HEALTH CANADA, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF 
CANNABIS IN CANADA 9 n.1, 10–11, 71 (2016), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/healthy-
canadians/migration/task-force-marijuana-groupe-etude/framework-cadre/alt/framework-cadre-
eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/2348-X8RW] (indicating that legalization of marijuana violates international 
agreements Canada is party to but overall concluding legalization better fits within the goals of the 
international agreements). 
166. See Nick Miroff, In Uruguay’s Marijuana Experiment, the Government is Your Pot Dealer, 
WASH. POST (July 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-uruguays-
marijuana-experiment-the-government-is-your-pot-dealer/2017/07/07/6212360c-5a88-11e7-aa69-
3964a7d55207_story.html [https://perma.cc/H73B-TQQ3]; see also HOWARD BROMBERG, MARK K. 
OSBECK, & MICHAEL VITIELLO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MARIJUANA LAW 201 (2019) (“Uruguay 
formally legalized adult use cannabis in 2013, arguing that cannabis use is a human right which 
overrides specific treaty terms.  Although Uruguay has not been sanctioned by the [International 
Narcotics Control Board], U.S. [b]anks, citing the Patriot Act, which prohibits U.S. financial 
institutions from doing business with illicit distributors of controlled substances, cut ties with 
Uruguayan banks.”). 
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inclusion at the statutory level in proposed adult use legislation.167  These 
elements are situated in three broad categories: (1) market and regulatory 
structures; (2) consumer-facing product and retailer regulation; and (3) youth, 
environmental exposure, and denormalization.  We apply these principles to a 
set of bills representing all active state legislation as of February 2019, as 
detailed in the Appendix. 
A.  Market and Regulatory Structures 
1.  Health Department Authority 
The priorities and approaches of regulatory agencies will shape the effects 
of legalization nearly as much as initial enabling legislation.  One of the most 
critical aspects of legalization legislation is therefore the government agency or 
agencies charged with developing and enforcing subsequent regulations.  
Legislatures may grant this authority to a variety of existing entities or create 
entirely new ones; however, from a public health perspective, the ideal 
approach is to designate the applicable health authority (i.e., state health 
department or equivalent) as the lead agency for this purpose.168  
Other authorities (e.g., tax boards) are capable of such regulation and may 
play supporting roles, but placing public health in the lead role fosters a 
regulatory approach that prioritizes public health over private industry profit 
when the two are in conflict, as is often the case.169  Legislatures can 
appropriately charge the health authority with a mandate to limit or discourage 
use for the benefit of public health.  Health authorities often operate with such 
goals in regulating tobacco, for example,170 and are well-positioned to do so for 
cannabis.  However, to date, legalizing states have instead typically created new 
cannabis-specific agencies or given regulatory authority to existing alcohol 
 
167. There are a number of other critical elements in existing adult use cannabis laws and 
proposed laws that have important public health effects.  We have not included, for example, provisions 
that remain the subject of unsettled debate within the public health community, such as specific limits 
on the potency of cannabis and cannabis products.  We have also not included elements more likely to 
be addressed through regulatory action than in statute, such as the content of public education 
campaigns. 
168. See, e.g., Barry, Hiilamo, & Glantz, supra note 16, at 209. 
169. See id.  This is not to say that a for-profit market is a given.  See supra Section II.A.2. (a 
state-controlled or not-for-profit market is preferable from a public health perspective).  However, even 
in such systems, there may be a role for private companies and, as such, potential for conflict between 
private and public interests.  See Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, 
at 1022. 
170. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 74. 
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control boards or departments of tax/revenue.171  Such bodies are more likely 
to have mandates to encourage business development or manage revenue. 
While, as of July 2019, several existing adult use states included their health 
department or equivalent among the administrative agencies tasked with 
implementation of adult use legalization,172 none have made their health 
department the lead or primary agency, often vesting authority in liquor control 
boards or state commerce departments.173  However, some proposed bills would 
establish the state health department as the lead regulatory authority, including 
in Hawaii174 and Minnesota,175 the latter of which also includes explicit 
reference to “public health standards and practices” as guiding principles for 
implementation.176  A West Virginia bill would place adult use cannabis under 
the regulatory authority of the Bureau for Public Health,177 which also regulates 
the state’s medical cannabis program.178  A Missouri bill would vest primary 
authority for regulation in the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control, within 
the state’s Department of Public Safety.179 
 
171. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 171 (assessing Alaska, Colorado, 
Oregon, and Washington); A.B. 64, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (Sections 26001(b) and 
26010 create the Bureau of Marijuana Control within Department of Consumer Affairs); Nevada State 
Question 2 (2016) §§ 3(4), 5 (Department of Taxation); Massachusetts Question 4 (2016) § 76 (creating 
Cannabis Control Commission); Michigan Question 1 (2018) §§ 3, 7.1 (Department of Licensing and 
Regulatory Affairs).  See also Maine Question 1 (2016) § 2444 (granting authority to Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry). 
172. For example, the California Department of Public Health oversees standards for cannabis 
manufacturing, including production, packaging, and labeling of all cannabis products.  CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE §§ 26012(3), 26106 (2017). 
173. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325(1) (2017) (authority of the Washington State 
Liquor and Cannabis Board); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.025 (2017) (powers of Oregon Liquor Control 
Commission); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26012(1) (2017) (authority of Bureau of Cannabis Control 
within Department of Consumer Affairs); ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.080 (2019) (powers of Marijuana 
Control Board within Department of Commerce, Community and Economic Development).  Illinois’s 
new law similarly vests most authority in the Department of Agriculture and Department of Financial 
and Professional Regulation, with the Department of Public Health in a supporting and advisory role.  
H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 5-10, 5-15, 5-25(a) (Ill. 2019). 
174. H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 2-1, 11 (Haw. 2019). 
175. H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, §§ 3–4 (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. 
art. 1, §§ 3–4 (Minn. 2019). 
176. Minn. H.F. 420, art. 1, § 1, subdiv. 18; Minn. S.F. 619 art. 1, § 1, subdiv. 18.  Another less 
comprehensive Minnesota bill also includes a provision making the state health department the primary 
agency.  H.F. 4541, 2018 Leg., 90th Sess. art. 1, § 3, subdiv. 1 (Minn. 2018). 
177. H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 § 16A-17-6(a) (W. Va. 2019). 
178. W. VA. CODE §§ 16A-2-1(3), 16A-3-1(a) (2020). 
179. H.B. 551, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. §§ 195.2150 (1)(2), 195.2159 (1) (Mo. 2019). 
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Several other proposed bills would give the state health department 
authority over some aspects of the adult use regulatory program, such as 
regulating testing and manufacturing,180 designing safety inserts,181 
administering community reinvestment grants and cannabis health and safety 
funds,182 or collecting and analyzing data.183  Others would place the health 
department in a more limited or advisory role, such as providing assistance on 
labeling rules184 or consulting on development of a public health campaign 
regarding adult use cannabis.185  
2.  State Monopoly or Non-Profit Requirement 
State control of one or more aspects of the cannabis market is likely to help 
mitigate negative public health impacts of legalization.  In alcohol policy, 
government monopolies allow control of price, location, advertising, and other 
elements that affect behavior, particularly excessive consumption.186  
Transitioning from state-run to privatized alcohol markets is associated with 
increased alcohol sales,187 including increased purchase frequency by younger 
drinkers.188 CDC’s Community Preventive Services Task Force specifically 
 
180. H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11-16A-15(d), (f) (W. Va. 2019). 
181. H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-12 (W. Va. 2019). 
182. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 42, 43 (N.M. 2019). 
183. H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:22) (N.H. 2019). 
184. E.g., H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5-25(a) (Ill. 2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–20 
Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 31 (art. 11, § 181) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. § 177 (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (art. 11, § 181) (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 
3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (art. 11, § 180) (N.Y. 2017). 
185. E.g., S.B. 1509, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 2, § 19 (N.Y. 2019); H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5-30 (Ill. 2019). 
186. Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1023.  We 
acknowledge that, in the United States, state alcohol monopolies are the target of both ideological and 
economic criticism and face numerous political and practical challenges despite their demonstrated 
public health utility.  See generally Robin Room, Alcohol Monopolies in the U.S.: Challenges and 
Opportunities, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 509 (1987) (surveying the history of state alcohol monopolies 
and assessing challenges).  Despite these challenges, we include market structure in our assessment of 
a public health approach to cannabis based on its demonstrated public health benefits in alcohol control.  
Contra Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 72–73 (noting that state cannabis 
monopolies and other non-commercial market structures might be beneficial but declining to include 
this element in proposed framework because it would not be practically feasible).  
187. Alexander C. Wagenaar & Harold D. Holder, Changes in Alcohol Consumption Resulting 
from the Elimination of Retail Wine Monopolies: Results from Five U.S. States, 56 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 
566, 570, 572 (1995) (examining wine sales in five U.S. states following privatization of wine sales in 
those jurisdictions).  
188. William C. Kerr, Yu Ye, & Thomas Greenfield, Changes in Spirits Purchasing Behaviours 
after Privatisation of Government-Controlled Sales in Washington, USA, 38 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 
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recommends against privatization of alcohol markets.189  While no U.S. states 
have yet adopted a state-run cannabis market (likely due in part to federal 
illegality), Uruguay has adopted this approach in their national legalization 
framework.190 
As in states that adopted legalization via initiative, most legislative 
proposals also adopt a for-profit, commercial structure.191  One notable 
exception, however, is New Mexico’s S.B. 577, which would create a state 
monopoly on sales.192 
3.  Unitary Regulatory System 
Merging the regulatory structures for medical and adult use cannabis seeks 
to reduce regulatory complexity because complexity benefits larger business 
entities that have more extensive financial resources.193  A unitary system is 
also more transparent and more consistent with regulation of other products, 
few of which are regulated under bifurcated systems depending on how they 
are used.194  While tax rates and other aspects may differ between medical and 
adult use cannabis operations within a unitary market, entirely separate 
regulatory systems may encourage misuse of the medical system by either 
consumers or suppliers.195  The added complexity also makes enforcement of 
regulations more difficult, a particular problem in resource-limited states. 
Some existing adult use states have merged their medical and adult use 
regulatory systems.196  Proposed bills in New Jersey,197 New Mexico,198 Rhode 
 
294, 298 tbl.2 (2019) (finding increased purchase frequency among drinkers 18–29 following market 
privatization in Washington State). 
189. CPSTF Findings for Excessive Alcohol Consumption, supra note 107.  
190. Miroff, supra note 166. 
191. See generally 2020 Marijuana Policy Reform Legislation, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, 
https://www.mpp.org/issues/legislation/key-marijuana-policy-reform/ [https://perma.cc/FLM9-
GSY9]. 
192. S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(H) (N.M. 2019). 
193. See Barry, Hiilamo, & Glantz, supra note 16, at 209. 
194. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 82. 
195. Id.  
196. See, e.g., S.B. 94, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (Section 1(g) states the purposes 
of law, including single regulatory structure.); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.375 (2018) (medical 
marijuana endorsement process for retail licensees); see also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475B.010, 475B.025 
(2017) (stating powers of Oregon Liquor Control Commission, including authority pursuant to statutes 
governing both adult use and medical cannabis); but see OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.949 (2017) (giving 
rulemaking authority over medical cannabis program to the Oregon Health Authority). 
197. A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 7–8 (N.J. 2018) (Cannabis Regulatory Commission); 
S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (N.J. 2018) (Cannabis Regulatory Commission). 
198. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(B) (N.M. 2019) (Cannabis Control Division). 
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Island,199 Vermont,200 and West Virginia201 would similarly create unitary 
systems overseeing both medical and adult use cannabis regulation.  
In contrast, bills in Maryland,202 Minnesota,203 and West Virginia,204 among 
others, would create new adult use regulatory frameworks without altering 
existing oversight of medical cannabis programs.  By example, a New Jersey 
bill would create a new Division of Marijuana Enforcement in the Department 
of Law and Public Safety to oversee adult use cannabis regulation while leaving 
the state’s Department of Health in charge of regulating medical cannabis.205  
Illinois’s enacted bill similarly leaves the state’s medical cannabis program 
intact, with conflicts between the new adult use law and the medical program 
as related to medical cannabis patients to be resolved in favor of the medical 
program’s provisions.206  
4.  Exclusion of Industry from Formal Regulatory Roles 
As stated in the Implementing Guidelines to Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC, 
“[t]here is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco 
industry’s interests and public health policy interests.”207  The WHO recognizes 
that the industry “sees itself as a legitimate stakeholder in tobacco control and 
attempts to position itself as a legitimate partner,” but unequivocally concludes 
that the industry “is not and cannot be a partner in effective tobacco control.”208  
Tobacco industry interference precipitates policies that are scientifically 
 
199. S.B. 2895, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(21-28.11-3) (R.I. 2018). 
200. H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (tit. 7, § 841(b)(4)) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 9 (tit.7, § 841(b)(4) (Vt. 2019). 
201. H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 16A-17-6(a) (W.Va. 2019) (authorizing Bureau of 
Public Health to adopt implementing rules).  The Bureau of Public Health oversees the state’s existing 
medical cannabis program.  W. VA. CODE § 16A-3-1(a) (2020). 
202. H.B. 632, 2019 Leg, Reg. Sess. § 1 (art. XX § 2(B)(2)(IV)) (Md. 2019) (prohibiting 
regulations issued under new law from limiting licensure of businesses dealing only in medical 
cannabis). 
203. H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. §§ 2 (subdiv. 1), 26 (Minn. 2019) (creating Bureau of 
Cannabis Oversight without altering authority of Commissioner of Health to regulate medical 
cannabis). 
204. H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11-16A-2 (W. Va. 2019) (defining “regulatory 
agency”); W. VA. CODE § 16A-3-1(a). 
205. A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 6, 22 (N.J. 2018). 
206. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 55-85(a) (Ill. 2019). 
207. WHO FCTC GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at 5. 
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inaccurate and do not adequately protect public health,209 and the industry 
routinely presents misleading scientific evidence.210 
The cannabis industry is not the tobacco industry (at least not yet211), but 
the innate conflict between the cannabis industry’s interests and those of public 
health are no less concerning.  Notwithstanding the potential medical 
applications of cannabis, which are not the focus of this analysis, adult use 
cannabis is a product with harmful health effects that can result in use disorders 
and dependence.212  Even in the absence of objectively bad corporate behavior 
like that of the tobacco industry, the cannabis industry’s profit-seeking 
orientation213 will ultimately lead to business strategies that increase demand 
and ensure continuing initiation of young consumers to replace those that stop 
using (whether by cessation or expiration).214  These interests are unalterably 
opposed to those of public health. 
Consequently, relations between the cannabis industry and regulatory 
agencies, advisory boards, and other entities should be limited to transparent, 
arms-length interactions.  Among existing adult use states, Oregon has 
prohibited industry representatives from having formal policymaking roles, 
while Colorado and Alaska have allowed industry members to serve on 
 
209. See, e.g., Stella A. Bialous & Derek Yach, Whose Standard Is It, Anyway? How the Tobacco 
Industry Determines the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Standards for Tobacco 
and Tobacco Products, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 96, 101 (2001) (discussing industry interference in 
setting international standards for tobacco products in the ISO). 
210. See, e.g., Selda Ulucanlar, Gary J. Fooks, Jenny L. Hatchard, & Anna B. Gilmore, 
Representation and Misrepresentation of Scientific Evidence in Contemporary Tobacco Regulation: A 
Review of Tobacco Industry Submissions to the UK Government Consultation on Standardised 
Packaging, 11 PLOS MED. 1, 11 (2014) (discussing industry scientific evidence presented on 
standardized packaging in the United Kingdom). 
211. See Barry, Hiilamo, & Glantz, supra note 16, at 209. 
212. See Alan J. Budney, Michael J. Sofis, & Jacob T. Brodovsky, An Update on Cannabis Use 
Disorder with Comment on the Impact of Policy Related to Therapeutic and Recreational Cannabis 
Use, 269 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 73, 81 (2019); Marijuana: Is 
Marijuana Addictive?, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/marijuana-addictive 
[https://perma.cc/65Q3-RCA6]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5 DIAGNOSES AND NEW ICD-10-CM 
CODES 1, 2 (2017), http://www.acbhcs.org/providers/qa/docs/training/DSM-IV_DSM-
5_SUD_DX.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ3X-S42G]. 
213. An exception would be a government-controlled monopoly or a not-for-profit restriction.  
See supra Section II.A.2. 
214. As the tobacco industry well understands, and explicitly stated in a confidential internal 
memorandum in the 1980s, “[y]ounger adults are the only source of replacement smokers.”  
Memorandum from R.J. Reynolds, The Importance of Younger Adults 2 (Undated), 
https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/jzyl0056 [https://perma.cc/2KAQ-2AE3]. 
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advisory boards, and Alaska has even allowed two industry members to serve 
on a five-person committee to design the state’s regulatory system.215 
Most state proposals do not explicitly address industry participation in 
official regulatory bodies.216  Those that do take positions at both extremes.  
Three Minnesota bills would bar cannabis industry members from serving on 
the advisory council created under the bill.217  In stark contrast, a New Mexico 
bill would require a comparable advisory committee to include an industry 
representative.218  A New Hampshire bill would create an eleven-member 
advisory board with up to six positions potentially open to industry members, 
based on the description of expertise required.219  Illinois’s enacted 2019 
legislation reserves one of twenty-four positions on the newly created Adult 
Use Cannabis Health Advisory Committee for a representative of cannabis 
business licensees.220 
5.  Local Control and Non-Preemption 
A well-crafted cannabis legal framework preserves the authority of local 
jurisdictions to regulate business operations within their borders in keeping 
with community needs and values.  Local regulation is a cornerstone of public 
health law.  While the federal government’s authority is supreme, state and 
local governments are closer to the people and typically better able to respond 
to the health needs of the community because of their “local knowledge, civic 
engagement, and direct political accountability.”221  Local government has 
more limited authority, and its authority is dependent largely on delegations of 
power under state law, but public health issues often place local officials on the 
“front line.”222 
Local jurisdictions have historically been leaders in advancing public health 
approaches to health hazards.  This is particularly evident in the history of 
 
215. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 915. 
216. This does not include provisions addressing direct conflicts of interest for regulators.  See, 
e.g., Bowling & Glantz, supra note 163, at 425 tbl.1; see also Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra 
note 71, at 919–20. 
217. H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 4, subdiv. 3(a) (Minn. 2019); H.F. 4541, 2018 Leg., 
90th Sess. art. 1, § 3, subdiv. 2(a) (Minn. 2018); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, §4, subdiv. 3 
(Minn. 2019). 
218. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(E)(1) (N.M. 2019). 
219. See H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:8(II)) (N.H. 2019).  
220. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5-25(b)(23) (Ill. 2019). 
221. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 81 (2nd ed. 
2008).  
222. JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 59–60 (3d. ed. 2018). 
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tobacco control.  Local jurisdictions were the first to adopt smoking restrictions 
for workplaces and public places, building critical mass and political will for 
states to follow suit.223  Advancing state laws that include preemption of local 
regulatory action is a favored tactic of the tobacco industry for precisely this 
reason and creates a significant obstacle for tobacco control.224  Eliminating 
preemption of local tobacco control measures in state law remains a goal of 
health advocates,225 and nascent cannabis laws should avoid creating similar 
obstacles to local regulation.  Preemption (specifically ceiling preemption) of 
local regulation can hinder beneficial public health action in situations where 
cross-jurisdictional uniformity is not necessary.226 
Existing legalizing states have generally preserved local authority to 
regulate cannabis businesses.  Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington all 
authorize local jurisdictions to restrict or prohibit commercial cannabis 
operations within their borders (with Oregon requiring a general election 
referendum to do so).227  California also vests local governments with such 
control,228 though the boundaries of this authority remain in question to some 
extent and subject to litigation and political maneuvering.229  
Proposed bills generally would give localities authority to limit or prohibit 
operation of cannabis business within their jurisdiction.  As presented in Table 
1, bills that explicitly address this issue preserve local authority to prohibit at 
least some classes of cannabis business entities within their borders, and the 
majority allow localities to completely prohibit cannabis operations. 
 
 
223. See generally Michael Siegel, Julia Carol, Jerie Jordan, Robin Hobart, Susan 
Schoenmarklin, Fran DuMelle, & Peter Fisher, Preemption in Tobacco Control. Review of an 
Emerging Public Health Problem, 278 JAMA 858 (1997). 
224. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, State Preemption of Local Tobacco Control 
Policies Restricting Smoking, Advertising, and Youth Access—United States, 2000–2010, 60 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1124 (2011); Siegel, Carol, Jordan, Hobart, Schoenmarklin, 
DuMelle, & Fisher, supra note 223, at 862. 
225. HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Tobacco Use, supra note 110. 
226. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: REVITALIZING LAW AND POLICY TO 
MEET NEW CHALLENGES 48–52 (2011).  
227. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 77. 
228. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26200(a) (2020). 
229. Ongoing litigation addresses whether localities have the authority to prohibit cannabis 
deliveries within their borders.  Blood, supra note 70.  A 2019 state legislative proposal would also 
require localities that voted in favor of the state’s 2016 legalization initiative to issue a number retail 
cannabis licenses equal to at least one-sixth of active alcoholic beverage sales licenses in the 
jurisdiction.  A.B. 1356, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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TABLE 1: LOCAL CONTROL AND NON-PREEMPTION PROVISIONS IN PROPOSED 
BILLS230 





Arizona S.C. Res. 1022 § 1 (4-410)231 
Connecticut 
H.B. 5458 § 11 
S.B. 487 § 17 
Kentucky S.B. 80 § 16 
Maryland H.B. 632 § 1, art. XX (2)(C) 
Minnesota 
H.F. 420 art. 1, § 16 
H.F. 4541 art. 1, § 4 
Missouri H.B. 551 § A (195.2156) 
New Hampshire H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:11) 
New Jersey 
A.B. 3581 § 12(b) 
A.B. 3819 §11(c) 
S.B. 2702 § 12(b) 
S.B. 2703 § 20(b) 
   
   
 
230. S.C. Res. 1022, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 1 (4-410) (Ariz. 2019); H.B. 5458, 2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 11 (Conn. 2018); S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 17 (Conn. 2018); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 16 (Ky. 2019); H.B. 632, 2019 Leg, Reg. Sess. § 1 (art. XX (2)(C)) (Md. 2019); H.F. 420, 
2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 16 (Minn. 2019); H.F. 4541, 2018 Leg., 90th Sess. art. 1, § 4 (Minn. 
2018); H.B. 551, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § A (195.2156) (Mo. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th 
Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:11) (N.H. 2019); A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 12(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 
3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(c) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 12(b) (N.J. 2018); 
S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 20(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. 
§ 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.§ 31 (art. 11, § 
167(3)(b)) (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) (N.Y. 2019); 
S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 15 (221.05-a) (N.Y. 2017); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess.§ 9 
(tit. 7, § 863) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (tit. 7, § 863) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 2371, 2019 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 3 § 3.2-4145 (Va. 2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 
3 § 3.2-4150 (Va. 2019); H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 16A-17-4, -6(c) (W. Va. 2019); H.B. 
1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 55-25 (Ill. 2019); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 7–8 (N.M. 
2019); S.B. 2895, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (21-28.11-10) (R.I. 2018); H.B. 722, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 7 (N.H. 2019); H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 11(A)(3) (N.M. 2019). 
231. The Arizona proposal is a legislative concurrent resolution calling for a citizen referendum.  
Ariz. S.C. Res. 1022 § 1.  While referenda and initiatives are often grouped together because they both 
subject policymaking to popular vote, a key difference is that referenda originate in the legislature 
before submission to voters.  As a result, we treat this referendum as a legislative form of legalization 
for purposes of this Article. 
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A.B. 1617 § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) 
A.B. 3506 § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) 
S.B. 1527 § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) 
S.B. 3040 § 15 (221.05-a)232 
Vermont 
H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 863) 
S.B. 54 § 7 (tit. 7, § 863) 
Virginia 
H.B. 2371 art. 3 § 3.2-4145 
H.B. 2373 art. 3 § 3.2-4150 







H.B. 1438 § 55-25 (may prohibit, but may 
not regulate more restrictively than state law) 
New Mexico 
S.B. 577 §§ 7–8 (may not allow and then 
later prohibit)234 
Rhode Island 
S.B. 2895 § 1 (21-28.11-10) (must pass 







H.B. 722 § 7 (does not include 
growing/harvesting) 
New Mexico 
H.B. 356 § 11(A)(3) (may prohibit retail 
cannabis product sales, but not personal 
production or medical-only sellers) 
6.  Revenue Allocation 
It is essential that revenues from cannabis regulation and taxation fully 
cover, at minimum, the costs of administering and enforcing regulatory 
structures established to oversee the new market.  Ideally, revenues should also 
cover reasonably anticipated economic externalities, including future health 
costs, though these are difficult to quantify in advance, particularly given the 
current state of scientific evidence regarding the effects of cannabis use.  An 
appropriate model for estimating these costs may be to base the estimates on 
the effects of comparable levels of tobacco use (which are presently higher than 
cannabis use).  Tobacco represents a historic failure to address such 
 
232. The bill would allow localities to prohibit commercial operations but not to prohibit 
personal cultivation.  N.Y. S.B. 3040 § 15(2). 
233. This bill provides for a county-level election to allow cannabis production and sales, with 
additional municipal-level regulation of the operation, location, and number of cannabis 
establishments. 
234. This bill creates a state-operated sales monopoly.  N.M. S.B. 577 § 3(H). 
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externalities.  Tobacco use imposes massive costs on healthcare systems, but it 
was not until the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that states began 
to recover some of the costs to their public health systems from smoking-related 
illnesses and death.235  Despite large influxes of revenue from the MSA, states 
have continued to direct less than 1% of these funds to tobacco prevention 
programs and to fund such efforts at levels far below those recommended by 
the CDC, stymying their effectiveness.236 
The health effects of cannabis use are not yet well understood, making 
projections of future health costs challenging.  Analogies to other substances, 
such as tobacco, are useful but incomplete because cannabis use patterns differ 
and appear to be in flux.  For example, as of 2017, dried flower remained the 
most commonly used cannabis product and had the most direct parallels to 
tobacco use, but cannabis edibles and other consumption methods were 
growing in popularity.237  Given the uncertainty of other costs, cannabis 
revenues should fund continuing research efforts to better understand the 
impact of legalization, including health effects, to avoid the accumulation of 
substantial unfunded costs as has occurred for tobacco.238  Cannabis revenue 
allocation (and underlying taxation levels) should adapt to this new evidence as 
it develops. 
However, using cannabis revenues for other purposes is politically 
attractive.  For example, Colorado legalization advocates made education 
funding via cannabis revenues a centerpiece of campaign advertisements in 
2012.239  State budgets also tend to absorb funds that are not earmarked for 
specific purposes, as has often been the case for tobacco revenues.240  However, 
there is also some risk in directing cannabis revenues exclusively to cannabis-
 
235. PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 1–2 
(2018), https://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/MSA-Overview-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5E2J-RBAL]. 
236. Id. at 8; CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, ACTUAL ANNUAL TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY THE STATES, 1998–2010, at 1 (2019), 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0365.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q39A-N6Y5]. 
237. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 52. 
238. Barry & Glantz, Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry, supra note 115, at 3–6.  
239. Matt Ferner, Marijuana Legalization TV Ad Says: ‘Let’s Have Marijuana Tax Money Go 
To Our Schools Rather Than Criminals’, HUFFPOST (Oct. 4, 2012), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/marijuana-legalization-tv_n_1936723 [https://perma.cc/HC7J-
XQPJ]. 
240. KERRY CORK, PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., TOKING, SMOKING, AND PUBLIC HEALTH: 
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related programs if regulatory agencies become dependent on the sales of the 
substance they regulate.241 
Of the first four legalizing states, only Washington dedicated a portion of 
revenue to funding a continuous research program,242 though health 
departments in the other three states subsequently acted to support such efforts 
with existing funding sources or sought to obtain new funds.243  Later legalizing 
states, for example California, earmarked some annual funding for research, 
enforcement, and youth prevention, among other purposes.244 
As described in Table 2, state proposals take dramatically different 
approaches to revenue allocation.  Many appropriately set aside funds first to 
cover administration and enforcement.  Some bills direct remaining funds 
primarily to cannabis-related programs, including public education, drug 
treatment, intoxicated driving prevention, mental health services, and cannabis 
research.  However, other bills dedicate substantial revenues to other purposes, 
including infrastructure, business development, and state general funds. 
Legislatures are at times plain in their intention to generate significant 
revenue from cannabis.  For example, a Hawaii bill includes a provision stating, 
“The legislature finds that it is high time Hawaii begins to reap the revenue 
benefits from taxing adult cannabis use.”245  Similarly, several New York bills 
would explicitly require the responsible agency to regularly review tax rates 
and recommend changes to further three purposes: “maximizing net revenue,” 
minimizing illegal industry, and discouraging underage use.246 
 
 
241. ROLLES & MURKIN, supra note 123, at 85. 
242. CORK, supra note 240, at 26. 
243. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 916. 
244. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 34019(b)–(h) (2019).  However, as of July 2019, cannabis 
revenues have been far lower than initial projections and consumed by enforcement costs.  As a result, 
no earmarked state funds for other programs have yet been distributed, though some localities have 
used local cannabis revenues for a variety of programs.  See Lisa M. Krieger, Where Does California’s 
Cannabis Tax Money Go? You Might Be Surprised., MERCURY NEWS (May 25, 2019), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/05/25/where-does-californias-cannabis-tax-money-go/ 
[https://perma.cc/7TEQ-APL7]. 
245. H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Haw. 2019). 
246. A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 33 (art. 18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 
3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 33 (art. 18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (art. 18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (art. 
18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2017). 
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TABLE 2: REVENUE ALLOCATION IN PROPOSED BILLS247 
State Bill Selected Revenue Allocation Provisions 
Arizona 
S.C. Res. 1022 § 2 (art. 10, 
§ 42-5453(C)) 
40% to general fund, 40% to public 
education grants, 20% to drug treatment 
and rehabilitation 
Hawaii H.B. 1581 § 2 (19) 
Revenues first to implementation and 
enforcement, with excess to county 
infrastructure projects (50%) and local 
farm development grants (50%) 
Illinois H.B. 902 § 85 
After implementation and enforcement 
costs: 50% to general fund; 30% to State 
Board of Education; 5% to voluntary 
alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis abuse 
treatment programs; 5% to Department of 
Public Health for public education 
campaign targeting youth and adults; 2.5% 
to state employee retirement system; 2.5% 
to teachers’ retirement system; 2.%% to 
state university retirement system; 2.5% to 
state police for drug recognition experts 
Illinois 
[enacted] 
H.B. 1438 § 900-15 
(adding § 6z-107(c)(3)) 
Revenues first to administrative and 
enforcement costs, with remainder 
allocated 35% to general fund, 25% to 
criminal justice reform program, 20% for 
substance abuse and prevention and 
mental health, 10% for budget 
stabilization, 8% to local crime prevention 
programs relating to illicit cannabis and 
driving under the influence, and 2% to 
public education campaign 
 
247. S.C. Res. 1022, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (art. 10, § 42-5453(C)) (Ariz. 2019); H.B. 
1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. §  2-19 (Haw. 2019); H.B. 902, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 85 (Ill. 
2019); H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 900-15  (Ill. 2019) (adding § 6z-107(c)(3)); S.B. 
80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 18(4), 19, 20(3) (Ky. 2019); H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 18 
(Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 18 (Minn. 2019); H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. 
§ 25 (Minn. 2019); H.B. 551, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § A (195.2162(2)) (Mo. 2019); H.B. 
356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 54 (N.M. 2019); N.Y. A.B. 1617 § 32; N.Y. A.B. 3506 § 32; N.Y. S.B. 1527 
§ 32; N.Y. S.B. 3040 § 32; H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 6 § 3.2-4155(C) (Va. 2019); 
H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 5 § 3.2-4158(D) (Va. 2019); H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-13 (W. Va. 2019). 
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State Bill Selected Revenue Allocation Provisions 
Kentucky S.B. 80 §§ 18(4), 19, 20(3) 
80% to statewide fund distributed 95% to 
offset costs of program administration and 
enforcement, with remainder to substance 
abuse treatment programs (1%), public 
education (1%), and law enforcement 
training (3%); 20% to local funds in 
jurisdictions with cannabis businesses 
Minnesota 
H.F. 420 art. 1, § 18; S.F. 
619 art. 1, § 18 
$10 million annually to small businesses 
as part of a social justice program; 
remaining revenues 60% to the state’s 
general fund, 10% to mental health, 10% 
to police training, 10% to department of 
health research, 10% to education and 
public health programs 
Minnesota H.F. 465 § 25 
Revenues first to administration, then 40% 
mental health services, 40% early 
childhood education, and 20% to health 
department for education and public health 
program 
Missouri 
H.B. 551 § A 
(195.2162(2)) 
Revenues primarily to the state’s general 
fund 
New Mexico H.B. 356 § 54 
Revenues support cannabis regulation 
fund, community grants reinvestment 
fund, cannabis health and safety fund, 
cannabis research fund, and local DWI 
grant program 
New York 
A.B. 1617 § 32; 
A.B. 3506 § 32; 
S.B. 1527 § 32; 
S.B. 3040 § 32 
 
$1 million to revolving loan fund for 
licensees and microbusinesses; $1 million 
to state university to research and evaluate 
implementation and effects of law, 
including public health impacts; $750,000 
for license tracking and reporting; 
$750,000 to track and report violations of 
remaining cannabis laws; remaining funds 
to state lottery fund (25%), drug treatment 
education fund 25%), and community 
grants reinvestment fund (50%) 
Virginia 
H.B. 2371, art. 6 § 3.2-
4155(C) 
67% to general fund; 33% to retail 
marijuana education support fund to be 
used exclusively for public education 
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State Bill Selected Revenue Allocation Provisions 
Virginia 
H.B. 2373, art. 5 § 3.2-
4158(D) 
$20 million to Veterans Treatment Fund; 
remainder 30% to localities with cannabis 
businesses, 35% to general fund for 
Standards of Quality basic aid payments, 
35% to highway maintenance and 
operation fund 
West Virginia H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-13 
Revenues in excess of operating costs to 
teacher compensation and public 
employee insurance (25%), infrastructure 
(35%), law enforcement and community 
fund (15%), small business fund for 
grants/loans (15%), and public employee 
retirement system (10%, up to $2 million 
with excess to general fund) 
7.  Enforcement and Liability 
Unannounced compliance checks, including those using underage decoy 
buyers, are a key component of effectively enforcing retailer compliance 
regarding sales to minors.248  Existing evidence from tobacco and alcohol 
control indicates that active, frequent enforcement utilizing escalating 
penalties, up to and including license revocation, is appropriate and effective to 
influence retailer behavior and reduce sales to minors.249  In contrast, the 
absence of compliance testing and penalties for violation limits the 
effectiveness of state laws prohibiting sales to minors.250  To counter the 
potential for adult use markets to increase youth access and the appeal of 
cannabis to youth, maintaining high retailer compliance is crucial.251 
Among the first four adult use states, Washington provides for an 
unannounced compliance check program, but Alaska, Colorado, and Oregon do 
 
248. Lindsay F. Stead & Tim Lancaster, A Systematic Review of Interventions for Preventing 
Tobacco Sales to Minors, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 169, 171, 175 (2000). 
249. See, e.g., id.; Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Enhanced Enforcement of Laws to 
Prevent Alcohol Sales to Underage Persons—New Hampshire, 1999–2004, 53 MORBIDITY 
MORTALITY WKLY REP. 452, 453 (2004) (regarding alcohol). 
250. J. R. DiFranza & G. F. Dussault, The Federal Initiative to Halt the Sale of Tobacco to 
Children—the Synar Amendment, 1992–2000: Lessons Learned, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 93, 97 
(2005). 
251. See, e.g., Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 80; Barry & Glantz, Four 
US States, supra note 71, at 914–15. 
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not.252  Compliance reviews in Washington and Colorado in the early stages of 
legalization found overall high levels of compliance by retailers (88% and 91%, 
respectively).253 
Several proposed bills do not specifically provide for license revocation for 
sales to minors but leave establishment of grounds and procedures for license 
revocation to future regulations.254  Some bills do provide for specific penalties 
for sales to minors.  For example, multiple New Jersey bills would penalize 
employees or agents of a licensee with increasing civil penalties up to $1,000 
per violation and potentially result in revocation of the licensee’s license 
following a hearing.255  Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation authorizes random 
and unannounced inspections by regulators and state and local law 
enforcement,256 and provides for broad license suspension and revocation 
powers for violations generally,257 but does not explicitly apply these penalties 
to sales to minors.258 
Civil liability for retailers provides additional, indirect regulation on the 
behavior of commercial actors.  Borrowed from alcohol service, commercial 
host or “dram shop” liability (sometimes called “gram shop liability” for 
cannabis259) is retailer liability for injuries resulting from overservice or 
underage service and is a well-established but non-universal principle of state 
statutory tort law that relies primarily on deterrence effects.260  Thirty states 
have statutes imposing civil liability on establishments that sell or serve alcohol 
to individuals whose intoxication results in harms; twenty-two restrict liability 
to service of obviously intoxicated persons or persons under the legal drinking 
 
252. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 915. 
253. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 80. 
254. E.g., H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 4, subdiv. 2 (Minn. 2019); H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-
11(c)(1) (W. Va. 2019); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(G)(1) (N.M. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 7 (tit. 7, § 882) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9 (tit. 7, § 882) (Vt. 2019); 
H.B. 902, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 45(a)(1) (Ill. 2019). 
255. S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § (6)(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 
5(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6(b) (N.J. 2018). 
256. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 15-135 (Ill. 2019). 
257. Id. § 45-5. 
258. See id. § 10-20 (regarding identification). 
259. Jessica Berch, Reefer Madness: How Non-Legalizing States Can Revamp Dram Shop Laws 
to Protect Themselves from Marijuana Spillover from Their Legalizing Neighbors, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
863, 880–81 (2017); Hayley Dean, Through the Haze: Fashioning a Workable Model for Imposing 
Civil Liability on Marijuana Vendors, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 611, 613 (2013). 
260. Berch, supra note 259, at 884–85; Frank A. Sloan, Lan Liang, Emily M. Stout, & Kathryn 
Whetten-Goldstein, Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J. L. & ECON. 473, 498–
99 (2000). 
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age.261  Dram shop liability laws are associated with reductions in alcohol 
consumption and fatal crash ratios.262 
Despite the prevalence of dram shop liability laws nationally, none of the 
reviewed bills included provisions explicitly detailing retailer liability for 
cannabis.  However, other state statutory or case law may impose such 
liability.263 
B.  Consumer-Facing Product and Retailer Regulation 
1.  Packaging and Labeling 
A comprehensive public health approach to warning labels for cannabis and 
cannabis products should include evidence-based, effective measures from 
global tobacco control, such as plain packaging, graphic warning labels, and 
rotating health messaging.264  However, states may ultimately address these 
elements by rule rather than statute. 
a.  Packaging 
Packaging is fundamentally a marketing tool, one that other industries, 
including tobacco and alcohol, have used to great effect.  As with these 
products, branding on cannabis products offers the industry a secondary 
marketing opportunity to make up for other venues that may be legally 
restricted.265 
Plain packaging, devoid of all branding elements other than the brand name 
and product variant in plain text and specified font produced in a standard color 
(independent of product) as specified by the government, is one of the most 
 
261. Dram Shop Civil Liability and Criminal Penalty State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/dram-shop-liability-
state-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/X698-S4BB]. 
262. Michael Scherer, James C. Fell, Sue Thomas, & Robert B. Voas, Effects of Dram Shop, 
Responsible Beverage Service Training, and State Alcohol Control Laws on Underage Drinking Driver 
Fatal Crash Ratios, 16 TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION S59, S59 (2015).  Some scholars, notably Berch, 
propose gram shop laws not only for legalizing states, but also non-legalizing states that border them, 
with the aim of holding cannabis sellers accountable for injuries caused by consumers who travel or 
return to the non-legalizing neighbor state, a proposition beyond the scope of this Article.  Jessica 
Berch, Weed Wars: Winning the Fight Against Marijuana Spillover from Neighboring States, 19 NEV. 
L.J. 1, 6, 6 n.24 (2018); Berch, supra note 259, at 885.  
263. See Berch, supra note 259, at 884–88.  
264. DANIEL G. ORENSTEIN & STANTON A. GLANTZ, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES. 
AND EDUC., PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE FOR RECREATIONAL CANNABIS LAWS 2–4 (2018) 
[hereinafter ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE], 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/05d5g5db [https://perma.cc/23SR-NWE9]. 
265. See, e.g., id. at 7–8. 
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important and effective advances in tobacco control.  Plain packaging improves 
the effectiveness of warnings, reduces product appeal to adolescents and young 
adults, and increases attention and perception of harm, among other benefits.266  
While existing adult use states have not adopted plain packaging 
requirements,267 Oregon allows producers and manufacturers to bypass labeling 
and packaging approval if they use pre-approved, generic labels and 
packaging,268 effectively creating an opt-in plain packaging approach.  Outside 
the United States, Canada269 and Uruguay270 have adopted plain packaging 
provisions as part of their national adult use cannabis legalization frameworks. 
Two Minnesota bills would require minimalist packaging that includes 
most elements of a plain packaging standard, prohibiting product depiction, 
cartoons, and any images other than the company logo or name.271  (The 
allowance for a logo is the only departure from a comprehensive plain 
packaging standard.)  Like many other states’ proposed or enacted laws, these 
bills would also require the packaging to be opaque and child-resistant.272 
 
266. Melanie Wakefield, Kerri Coomber, Meghan Zacher, Sarah Durkin, Emily Brennan, & 
Michelle Soto, Australian Adult Smokers’ Responses to Plain Packaging with Larger Graphic Health 
Warnings 1 Year After Implementation: Results from a National Cross-sectional Tracking Survey, 24 
TOBACCO CONTROL ii17, ii17, ii24 (2015); P. Beede & R. Lawson, The Effect of Plain Packages on 
the Perception of Cigarette Health Warnings, 106 PUB. HEALTH 315, 321 (1992); Victoria White, 
Tahlia Williams, & Melanie Wakefield, Has the Introduction of Plain Packaging with Larger Graphic 
Health Warnings Changed Adolescents’ Perceptions of Cigarette Packs and Brands?, 24 TOBACCO 
CONTROL ii42, ii48 (2015); Daniella Germain, Melanie A. Wakefield, & Sarah J. Durkin, Adolescents’ 
Perceptions of Cigarette Brand Image: Does Plain Packaging Make a Difference?, 46 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 385, 388–90 (2010); Ingeborg Lund & Janne Scheffels, Young Smokers and Non-smokers 
Perceptions of Typical Users of Plain vs. Branded Cigarette Packs: A Between-subjects Experimental 
Survey, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1005, 1010–11 (2013); Crawford Moodie, Anne Marie Mackintosh, 
Gerard Hastings, & Allison Ford, Young Adult Smokers’ Perceptions of Plain Packaging: A Pilot 
Naturalistic Study, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 367, 367 (2011); Emily Brennan, Sarah J. Durkin, Trish 
Cotter, & Melanie A Wakefield, Mass Media Campaigns Designed to Support New Pictorial Health 
Warnings on Cigarette Packets: Evidence of a Complementary Relationship, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 
412, 416–17 (2011); Judith McCool, Lisa Webb, Linda D. Cameron, & Janet Hoek, Graphic Warning 
Labels on Plain Cigarette Packs: Will They Make a Difference to Adolescents?, 74 SOC. SCI. & MED. 
1269, 1269–70 (2012). 
267. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at tbl.A (Supp. 2018). 
268. OR. ADMIN. R. 845-025-7060 (2018).  
269. Cannabis Regulations, SOR/2018-144 §§ 111–121 (Can). 
270. See Miroff, supra note 166. 
271. H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 13 (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. 
art. 1, § 13 (Minn. 2019). 
272. Minn. H.F. 420 art. 1, § 13; Minn. S.F. 619 art. 1, § 13.  The same provisions would also 
require packaging to be recyclable or reusable if such materials are available, Minn. H.F. 420 art. 1, § 
13; Minn. S.F. 619 art. 1, § 13, an important environmental public health consideration, particularly in 
light of serious environmental pollution harms from tobacco products.  See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH 
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Several bills have packaging restrictions that target attempts to appeal to 
youth, but they often use broad, vague language.  Two Vermont bills would 
prohibit packaging that makes a cannabis product more appealing to children.273  
Two New Mexico bills would prohibit packaging that is “designed to be 
appealing to a child.”274  A Hawaii bill would require future regulations to 
prohibit “the use of any images designed or likely to appeal to minors, such as 
cartoons, toys, animals, or children; and any other likeness of images, 
characters, or phrases that are popularly used to advertise to children.”275  
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation contains a nearly identical provision, but 
adds a prohibition on “any packaging or labeling that bears reasonable 
resemblance to any product available for consumption as a commercially 
available candy.”276 
A Virginia bill uses particularly weak language with respect to packaging, 
prohibiting products labeled or packaged “in a manner that is specifically 
designed to appeal particularly to persons under 21.”277  Manufacturers could 
easily escape culpability under such a standard by arguing that they design their 
packaging to appeal to lawful young adult consumers (i.e., 21 and over) and 
that any appeal to underage consumers is unintentional.  One need look no 
further than the online marketing tactics of e-cigarette maker JUUL Labs Inc. 
(now partially owned by Philip Morris USA parent company Altria) and the 
company’s subsequent statements to see how an industry may deploy such a 
defense to parry accusations of inappropriately targeting youth.278 
 
ORG., TOBACCO AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: AN OVERVIEW 24–28 (2017) [hereinafter 




273. H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess.§ 7 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(3)(F)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 9 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(3)(F) (Vt. 2019). 
274. S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 12(B) (N.M. 2019); H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 17(B) 
(N.M. 2019). 
275. H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2-11(a)(16) (Haw. 2019). 
276. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 55-21(f)(5) (Ill. 2019). 
277. H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 4 § 3.2-4155(C)(2) (Va. 2019) (emphasis 
added). 
278. See Press Release, Kevin Burns, CEO, JUUL Labs, JUUL Labs Action Plan (Nov. 13, 
2018), https://newsroom.juul.com/juul-labs-action-plan/ [https://perma.cc/2UVB-HLB5] (defending 
the company and arguing that their “intent was never to have youth use JUUL products”); but see 
ROBERT K. JACKLER, CINDY CHAU, BROOK D. GETACHEW, MACKENZIE M. WHITCOMB, JEFFREY 
LEE-HEIDENREICH, ALEXANDER M. BHATT, SOPHIA H.S. KIM-O’SULLIVAN, ZACHARY A. HOFFMAN, 
LAURIE M. JACKLER, & DIVYA RAMAMURTHI, STAN. U. SCH. OF MED., JUUL ADVERTISING OVER 
ITS FIRST THREE YEARS ON THE MARKET: STANFORD RESEARCH INTO THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO 
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b.  Warning Labels 
Warning labels have demonstrated efficacy in tobacco control, influencing 
risk perceptions, health knowledge, motivation to quit, and appeal to youth.  
Warnings are most effective when they are large, prominently positioned, 
clearly worded, periodically changed to reduce familiarity, and designed to 
include pictorial content in addition to text.279 
As of July 2019, none of the existing adult use states required a warning 
label with pictorial content like that of tobacco graphic warning labels, though 
some do require a small (likely ineffective) warning symbol for cannabis 
products.280  Similarly, none of the proposed bills include specific requirements 
for rotating health warnings or pictorial content.  However, many bills would 
vest decision-making authority for package warnings in one or more regulatory 
bodies,281 meaning these entities could potentially adopt such requirements. 
For example, four New Jersey bills would require a warning label to 
“adequately inform consumers about safe marijuana use and warn of the 
consequences of misuse or overuse.”282  A New Mexico bill would require 
labels that warn of potential adverse effects.283  Six New York bills would 
 
ADVERTISING 1, 1 (2019), 
http://tobacco.stanford.edu/tobacco_main/publications/JUUL_Marketing_Stanford.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/92XX-8YD4] (concluding based on content analysis that “JUUL’s advertising 
imagery in its first 6 months on the market was patently youth oriented.  For the next 2 ½ years it was 
more muted, but the company’s advertising was widely distributed on social media channels frequented 
by youth, was amplified by hashtag extensions, and catalyzed by compensated influencers and 
affiliates.”).  
279. See ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 12–16 
(summarizing existing evidence from tobacco control and application to cannabis). 
280. See, e.g., CA. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 40412 (2018); OR. ADMIN. R. 333-007-0050, 333-007-
0200 (2018); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-3-1010 (2018); Marijuana Enforcement Division adopts a 
Single Universal Symbol and Streamlines Packaging and Labeling Requirements, ST. OF COLO., 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/IB%2018-
04%20Universal%20Symbol%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC5B-SWZ9]; Cannabis Universal 
Symbol, OREGON HEALTH AUTH., 
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PreventionWellness/marijuana/Pages/symbol.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/QGG5-P664]; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-106 (2020). 
281. S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(3)(f) (Ky. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9 
(tit. 7, § 907(D)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (tit. 7, § 907(D)) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 
2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (tit. 7, § 907(c)(1)(D)) (Vt. 2019); A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9(a)(7) 
(N.J. 2018); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8(a)(7) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 16(a)(7) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(E) (N.M. 2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg Sess. § 181 (N.Y. 2019). 
282. N.J. A.B. 3819 § 8(a)(7)(c); N.J. A.B. 4497 § 16(a)(7)(c); S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 16(a)(7)(c) (N.J. 2018).  
283. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 17(C)(6) (N.M. 2019). 
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authorize the responsible agency to seek the assistance of the state health 
department in developing regulations for warning labels including “any 
potential impact on human health resulting from the consumption of marihuana 
products . . . if such labels are deemed warranted . . . .”284  
Bills that do specify warning content tend to include minimal warnings 
similar to existing alcohol warning labels, which are the product of a voluntary 
code and do not appear to be particularly effective.285  These types of warning 
labels address only specific populations (e.g., children, pregnant women), use 
by minors, or driving while intoxicated.286 Some are even more basic, such as 
a West Virginia bill that would simply require a warning that the product is 
intoxicating and to keep it away from children.287 
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation charges the state’s Department of Public 
Health with defining and updating health warnings for cannabis but also 
includes specific warning language to be used unless modified by rule.288  
Among other label content, the bill requires all cannabis products to include a 
statement that “use can impair cognition and may be habit forming” and 
requires cannabis that may be smoked to include the statement, “Smoking is 
hazardous to your health.”289  While there are no requirements for pictorial or 
rotating elements in the legislation and some of the specified language does not 
reflect best practices, these are nonetheless a rare example of health-specific 
cannabis warnings. 
2.  Product Taxes 
Taxes on products like tobacco and alcohol are an effective means of 
decreasing consumption, particularly among adolescents, who are generally 
more price-sensitive.290  However, the existence of a robust illicit market for 
 
284. N.Y. A.B. 1617 § 31 (art. 11 § 181(4)); A.B. 2009, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 4 § 78(3) 
(N.Y. 2019), A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 181(4) (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1509, 2009 
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 78(3) (N.Y. 2019), S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (art. 11 § 181(4) (N.Y. 
2019); S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (art. 11 § 177(4)) (N.Y. 2017). 
285. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 919. 
286. See, e.g., S.B. 2895, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (21-28.11-8(d)(4)) (R.I. 2018); H.B. 2371, 
2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 4 § 3.2-4149(A)(9) (Va. 2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. art. 4 § 3.2-4155(A)(9) (Va. 2019); S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § (9)(a)(7)(d)(viii) 
(N.J. 2018). 
287. H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-12(b) (W. Va. 2019). 
288. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5-25(a) (Ill. 2019). 
289. Id. §§ 55-21(i)–(j). 
290. See, e.g., Summer Sherburne Hawkins, Nicoline Bach, & Christopher F. Baum, Impact of 
Tobacco Control Policies on Adolescent Smoking, 58 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 679, 681 (2016) 
(finding most price sensitivity among youngest adolescents with respect to cigarettes); Michael F. 
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cannabis is distinguishing and requires a balanced approach in which taxes are 
high enough to discourage abuse and youth use, but low enough to establish a 
stable legal market.291  While the public health approach distinctly prioritizes 
health interests over commercial interests, the legal market does have public 
health benefits over the illicit market with respect to age restriction, labeling, 
and product testing, among other areas.292  Experimentation among 
implementing jurisdictions will likely be necessary to identify characteristics 
of the supply and demand curves for legal cannabis and establish an ideal level 
of tax, which may also change as the legal market takes hold.  
As shown in Table 3, state proposals would take a variety of approaches to 
taxation.  Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation is notable not only because it was 
the only proposed bill to pass as of July 2019 but also because of its unique 
taxation approach.293  The legislation differentiates among cannabis products 
by THC content, taxing more potent products at a rate more than double that of 
lower-potency products (25% sales tax on products over 35% THC compared 
to 10% tax on products at or below that threshold) and also distinguishes 











Pesko, Jidong Huang, Lloyd D. Johnston, & Frank J. Chaloupka, E-cigarette Price Sensitivity Among 
Middle- and High-school Students: Evidence from Monitoring the Future, 113 ADDICTION 896, 902, 
905 (2017) (finding price sensitivity among adolescents for e-cigarettes); Xin Xu & Frank J. 
Chaloupka, The Effects of Prices on Alcohol Use and Its Consequences, 34 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 
236, 239–40 (2011) (discussing studies that consistently demonstrate inverse relationship between 
price and alcohol consumption among adolescents and youth). 
291. See, e.g., Mark A.R. Kleiman, We’re Legalizing Weed Wrong, SLATE (Nov. 7, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2016/11/america_is_legalizing_marijuana_wrong.
html [https://perma.cc/N4BW-G6JF]. 
292. See ROLLES & MURKIN, supra note 123, passim.  
293. See generally Ill. H.B. 1438.  
294. Id. § 65-10(a). 
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TABLE 3: TAX RATES IN PROPOSED BILLS295 
State Bill(s) Selected Provisions 
Escalating sales/excise tax with defined increase 
New Jersey A.B. 3581 § 11(a) 7% sales tax, escalating over 5 years to 15% 
New Jersey A.B. 3819 § 10(a) 7% sales tax, escalating over 5 years to 25% 
New Jersey S.B. 2702  § 11 
10% excise tax, escalating to 25% in 4 years; 
includes prevailing sales tax 
Escalating sales/excise tax with undefined adjustment 
Illinois H.B. 902 § 80 
10% excise tax to be adjusted annually for 
inflation 
New Hampshire 
H.B. 481 § 8 (77-
H:2(I–III)) 
$30 per ounce of flower; $10 per ounce of 
other plant material; $15 per immature plant; 
adjusted for inflation 
New York 
A.B. 1617 § 33; A.B. 
3506 § 33; S.B. 1527 
§ 33; S.B. 3040 § 33 
$0.62 per gram of flower and $0.10 per gram 
of leaves cultivation tax; $1.35 per immature 
plant nursery tax; 15% excise tax on all 
nonmedical purchases; rates to be adjusted 
every 2 years according to cost-of-living 
adjustment and to be regularly reviewed; local 
tax up to 2% 
Sales/excise tax > 10% 
Hawaii S.B. 686 § 2(329-I) 15% excise tax 
Illinois [enacted] H.B. 1438 § 65-10 
25% excise tax on cannabis over 35% THC; 
10% tax on cannabis at or below 35% THC; 
20% tax on cannabis-infused products 
 
295. A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(a) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 10(a) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11 (N.J. 2018); H.B. 902, 101st Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 80 (Ill. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 8 (77-H:2(I)) (N.H. 2019); A.B. 
1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 33 (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. § 33 (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040, 2017–18 
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 686, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(329-I) (Haw. 2019); Ill. H.B. 
1438 § 65-10; H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. §§ 1 (subdiv. 2), 3, 12 (Minn. 2019); H.B. 551, 100th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § A (195.2162) (Mo. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 16 (tit. 
32, §§ 7901–02) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 16A-17-7(a), 16A-17-4 (W. Va. 
2019); H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-13 (W. Va. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 
20(2) (Ky. 2019); H.B. 722, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.H. 2019); A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§§ 18(a), 19(a) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 18(a), 19(a) (N.J. 2018); H.B. 356, 
54th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 48–50 (N.M. 2019); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 33–34 (N.M. 2019); S.B. 
54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 14 (tit. 32, § 7901–02) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 14 
(tit. 32, § 7901–02) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 5 §§ 3.2-4158–59 (Va. 
2019); H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 3.2-4155(A), 3.2-4156(A) (Va. 2019).  
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State Bill(s) Selected Provisions 
Sales/excise tax > 10% cont. 
Minnesota 
H.F. 465 §§ 1 
(subdiv. 2), 3, 12 
15% gross revenues of processor; 12% gross 
receipts from retail sales and lounge 
admission; optional 3% local tax 
Missouri 
H.B. 551 § A 
(195.2162) 
20% at transfer from cultivator; additional 
local taxes allowed 
Vermont 
H.B. 196 § 16 (tit. 
32, §§ 7901–02) 
11% excise tax; optional 3% local tax 
West Virginia 
H.B. 2331 §§ 16A-
17-7(a), 16A-17-4 
15% excise tax; optional 5% local tax 
West Virginia H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-13 17.5% excise tax; optional 6% local tax 
Sales/excise tax ≤ 10% 
Kentucky S.B. 80 § 20(2) 
Excise tax 10% on flower, 5% on other plant 
parts, 8% on immature plants; additional sales 
tax permitted but not specified 
New Hampshire H.B. 722 § 2 8% sales tax 
New Jersey 
A.B. 4497 §§ 18(a), 
19(a) 
 
5.375% on receipts from retail sale in addition 
to existing sales tax; additional local tax up to 
2% 
New Jersey 
S.B. 2703 §§ 18(a), 
19(a) 
5.375% in addition to state sales and use tax; 
optional 2% local tax 
New Mexico H.B. 356 §§ 48–50 
9% excise tax (none on medial); up to 3% 
municipal tax; up to 3% county tax 
New Mexico S.B. 577 §§ 33–34 
4% state excise tax; optional 4% municipal 
tax; optional 4% county tax 
Vermont 
S.B. 54 § 14 (tit. 32, 
§ 7901–02); H.B. 250 
§ 14 (tit. 32, § 7901–
02) 
10% excise tax; 1% optional local tax 
Virginia 
H.B. 2373 art. 5 §§ 
3.2-4158–59 





9.7%; optional 5% local tax 
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3.  Product Access 
Unlike tobacco (and in many states alcohol), adult use cannabis is (so far) 
sold only in age-restricted venues.296  Provided this restriction remains in place 
and subject to active and comprehensive enforcement, it alleviates some 
product access concerns.  The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act of 2009 prohibited tobacco vending machines and self-service 
displays outside of adult-only facilities.297  However, access restrictions address 
more than youth use.  Total prohibitions on tobacco vending machines in all 
locations are associated with reduced smoking propensity, with those who live 
in an area with a total prohibition less likely to smoke.298 
Three Vermont bills would prohibit any direct customer access to cannabis 
products in a retail shop and require all products to be stored behind a counter 
or similar barrier.299  Two Virginia bills would prohibit vending machines, 
drive-through windows, and internet-based sales platforms, among other 
restrictions.300  Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation similarly prohibits drive-
through windows and vending machines.301  In contrast, two bills in Hawaii 
would explicitly allow operation of vending machines.302 
There is some debate as to public health best practices with respect to 
allowing product delivery.  Deliveries are difficult to regulate303 and increase 
the risk of illegal youth access, particularly given the inadequacy of most age 
verification approaches.304  However, Health Canada acknowledged an 
advantage to some cannabis delivery models in that their discretion (compared 
to more visible brick-and-mortar retail outlets) may not encourage increased 
usage.305  The Canadian Public Health Association also expressed concern that 
 
296. See, e.g., ROLLES, supra note 123, at 158. 
297. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 
1776, 1799 (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(c) (2016).  
298. Mike Vuolo, Brian C. Kelly, & Joy Kadowaki, Impact of Total Vending Machine 
Restrictions on US Young Adult Smoking, 18 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 2092, 2097–98 (2016). 
299. Vt. H.B. 250 § 2 (881)(4)(B); Vt. H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(4)(B)); Vt. S.B. 54 § 7 (tit. 
7, § (881)(4)(B)). 
300. Va. H.B. 2371 art. 3 § 3.2-4142(B)(2)(a); Va. H.B. 2373 art. 2 § 3.2-4146(B)(2)(a). 
301. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 15-70(n)(7)–(8) (Ill. 2019). 
302. H.B. 1515, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(712)(3) (Haw. 2019); S.B. 779, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 2(712)(3) (Haw. 2019). 
303. Barry & Glantz, Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry, supra note 115, at 5. 
304. See Rebecca S. Williams & Kurt M. Ribisl, Internet Alcohol Sales to Minors, 166 
ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 808, 810 tbl.2, 811 (2012) (finding that age verification 
by internet alcohol vendors failed to prevent sales to minors in 45% of study cases and that 59% of 
vendors used weak or no age verification). 
305. HEALTH CANADA, supra note 165, at 47, 76.   
 
ORENSTEIN_GLANTZ_03JUN20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2020  9:24 AM 
1366 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:1313 
storefront retailers could stimulate increased product variety and noted that a 
delivery-only system (as Canada operated for its medical cannabis program) 
“eliminates the likelihood of placement of shops near areas where children 
congregate, and concerns regarding signage and advertising for such shops.”306  
Combined with the risk that storefront retailer concentration may normalize 
and increase use (based on evidence from tobacco and alcohol control307), 
cannabis delivery may offer both benefits and risks for public health, and a total 
prohibition on delivery may not ultimately be ideal.  However, age verification 
processes would require substantial improvement in order to realize potential 
benefits while mitigating risks.  As with many other open questions regarding 
cannabis regulation, as evidence develops it will be far easier to liberalize an 
overly restrictive policy than to attempt to eliminate an established facet of the 
market.  
Of those bills that explicitly address delivery, seven bills in four states 
would prohibit it, while sixteen bills in nine states would permit it, as noted in 















306. A Public Health Approach to the Legalization, Regulation and Restriction of Access to 
Cannabis, CAN. PUB. HEALTH ASS'N (Nov. 6 2017), https://www.cpha.ca/public-health-approach-
legalization-regulation-and-restriction-access-cannabis [https://perma.cc/BV4Y-JV4X]. 
307. Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1023. 
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TABLE 4: CANNABIS DELIVERY IN PROPOSED BILLS308 
Type State Bills 
Delivery 
Prohibited 
Illinois [enacted] H.B.1438 §§ 15-70(n)(9)-(10) 
Minnesota 
H.F. 420 art. 1, § 6, subdiv. 9; 
S.F. 619 § 6(9) 
Vermont 
H.B. 250 § 907(e); 
S.B. 54 § 7 (tit. 7, § 907(e)) 
Virginia 
H.B. 2371 § 3.2-4142(B)(2)(d); 
H.B. 2373 art. 2 § 3.2-4146(B)(2)(d) 
Delivery 
Permitted 
Connecticut S.B. 487 § 18(5) 
Hawaii H.B. 1581 § 2(11)(a)(6) 
Illinois H.B. 902 § 935(3.5) 
Kentucky S.B. 80 § 2(3)(e) 
New Hampshire H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:9(I)(g)) 
New Jersey 
S.B. 2703 § (27)(h); 
A.B. 4497 § (27)(h) 
New York 
S.B. 1509 § 130(7); 
A.B. 2009 § 130(7); 
A.B. 1617 § 11(165)(5); 
S.B. 1527 § 11(165)(5); 
A.B. 3506 § 11(165)(5); 
S.B. 3040 § 11(165)(5) 
 
308. H.B.1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 15-70(n)(9)–(10) (Ill. 2019); H.F. 420, 2019 
Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 6, subdiv. 9 (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 6, subdiv. 
9 (Minn. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 907(e) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 
7 (tit. 7, § 907(e)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3.2-4142(B)(2)(d) (Va. 
2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 2 § 3.2-4146(B)(2)(d) (Va. 2019); S.B. 487, 
2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 18(5) (Conn. 2018); H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2-11(a)(6) (Haw. 
2019); H.B. 902, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 935(3.5) (Ill. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 2(3)(e) (Ky. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:9(I)(g)) (N.H. 2019); S.B. 2703, 218th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. § (27)(h) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § (27)(h) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 
1509, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess.§ 130(7) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 2009, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 130(7) (N.Y. 
2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 11(165)(5) (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(165)(5) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 11(165)(5) 
(N.Y. 2017); S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(165)(5) (N.Y. 2017); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 9 (tit. 7, § 907(c)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-8(1) (W. Va. 
2019); H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11-16A-8(1) (W. Va. 2019). 
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Type State Bills 
Delivery 
Permitted Cont. 
Vermont H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 907(c)) 
West Virginia 
H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-8(1); 
H.B. 2376 § 11-16A-8(1) 
4.  Outlet Density Restrictions 
Alcohol outlet density, the number of locations within a specific geographic 
area where alcohol is available for sale, is positively associated with excessive 
consumption and related harms.309  Because this finding applies to both on- and 
off-premises outlets (i.e., both bars and liquor stores), there are parallels to 
cannabis regulation whether or not a jurisdiction permits on-site consumption.  
Higher tobacco outlet density is also associated with increased youth smoking 
rates,310 and outlet density also affects adult smoking via interaction between 
price sensitivity and access costs, including travel time.311  While the economics 
of cannabis markets and their impact on youth and adult use are less well-
established than those of alcohol and tobacco, broadly similar effects are likely 
and a reasonable basis for limiting cannabis retail outlet density to protect 
public health. 
A New Jersey bill would set a statewide maximum of 218 licenses, 
including 98 medical licenses, with each legislative district receiving at least 2 
 
309. E.g., Carla Alexia Campbell, Robert A. Hahn, Randy Elder, Robert Brewer, Sajal 
Chattopadhyay, Jonathan Fielding, Timothy S. Naimi, Traci Toomey, Briana Lawrence, & Jennifer 
Cook Middleton, The Effectiveness of Limiting Alcohol Outlet Density as a Means of Reducing 
Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-related Harms, 37 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 556, 560 
(2009); see also Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Recommendations for Reducing 
Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-related Harms by Limiting Alcohol Outlet Density, 37 
AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 570, 570 (2009); Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra 
note 115, at 1023–24 (summarizing evidence and recommending limitations on outlet density to reduce 
harms). 
310. Lisa Henriksen, Ellen C. Feighery, Nina C. Schleicher, David W. Cowling, Randolph S. 
Kline, & Stephen P. Fortmann, Is Adolescent Smoking Related to the Density and Proximity of Tobacco 
Outlets and Retail Cigarette Advertising Near Schools?, 47 PREVENTIVE MED. 210, 211 (2008); Scott 
P. Novak, Sean F. Reardon, Stephen W. Raudenbush, & Stephen L. Buka, Retail Tobacco Outlet 
Density and Youth Cigarette Smoking: A Propensity-modeling Approach, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 670, 
673 (2006); Laura J. Finan, Sharon Lipperman-Kreda, Melissa Abadi, Joel W. Grube, Emily Kaner, 
Anna Balassone, & Andrew Gaidus, Tobacco Outlet Density and Adolescents’ Cigarette Smoking: A 
Meta-analysis, 28 TOBACCO CONTROL 27, 31 (2019).  
311. See, e.g., John E. Schneider, Robert J. Reid, N. Andrew Peterson, John B. Lowe, & Joseph 
Hughey, Tobacco Outlet Density and Demographics at the Tract Level of Analysis in Iowa: 
Implications for Environmentally Based Prevention Initiatives, 6 PREVENTIVE SCI. 319, 322 (2005). 
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licenses and the remaining 40 licenses considered at-large.312  Illinois’s enacted 
2019 legislation prohibits location of a retail cannabis dispensary within 1,500 
feet of the property line of any pre-existing dispensary.313 
In contrast, some states address density from the perspective of minimum 
rather than maximum outlets.  Another New Jersey bill would require a 
“sufficient number of [retailers] to meet the market demands of the state, and 
giving regard to geographical and population distribution.”314  A separate New 
Jersey bill would require a minimum one retail store per county, amounting to 
twenty-one in the state, but would allow local governments to set maximums to 
account for population distribution and consumer access.315  A West Virginia 
bill would set a minimum of one retail cannabis store for every ten retail liquor 
stores, though regulators could reduce this if there are an insufficient number 
of qualified applicants.316  
5.  Day and Time Operating Restrictions 
Evidence from alcohol control indicates that limits on the days and hours 
during which alcohol can be sold are an effective intervention to reduce 
excessive consumption and related harms.317  Studies that support the 
effectiveness of these approaches typically assess the effects of removing 
existing restrictions, demonstrating an association between such a change and 
increased consumption and motor vehicle-related harms.318   Studies on 
imposing new limits are lacking.  However, a systematic review of studies on 
day and time operating restrictions (as well as outlet density) found that most 
studies support the existence of an effect on one or more key outcomes (overall 
alcohol consumption, drinking patterns, and damage from alcohol).319  A 
precautionary approach to cannabis based on existing alcohol control evidence 
is warranted given the similar intoxicating potential of cannabis use. 
 
312. S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9(a)(14) (N.J. 2018). 
313. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 15-70(n)(15) (Ill. 2019).  
314. A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 16(a)(14) (N.J. 2018). 
315. A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8(a)(14) (N.J. 2018). 
316. H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §11-16A-15(c)(5)(A) (W. Va. 2019). 
317. Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Recommendations on Maintaining Limits 
on Days and Hours of Sale of Alcoholic Beverages to Prevent Excessive Alcohol Consumption and 
Related Harms, 39 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 605, 605 (2010). 
318. Id.  
319. Svetlana Popova, Norman Giesbrecht, Dennis Bekmuradov, & Jayadeep Patra, Hours and 
Days of Sale and Density of Alcohol Outlets: Impacts on Alcohol Consumption and Damage: A 
Systematic Review, 44 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 500, 501, 512–14 (2009). 
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State proposals in general do not address cannabis establishment operating 
hours, leaving them to implementing regulations or local rules.320  However, at 
least three bills address operating hours at the statutory level.  Bills in New 
Hampshire and West Virginia would leave specific operating hour restrictions 
to implementing regulations, but stipulate that the regulations not allow retailers 
to operate before 6:00 a.m. or after 11:45 p.m.321  Illinois’s enacted 2019 
legislation limits dispensary operating hours to between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 
p.m.322 
C.  Youth, Environmental Exposure, and Denormalization 
1.  Minimum Purchase Age  
All U.S. states have adopted a legal drinking age of 21, though many did 
not do so until pressured by the federal government in the 1980s.323  A growing 
number of jurisdictions had also raised their minimum legal age for tobacco 
purchase to 21 before the federal government adopted a national minimum age 
of 21 for tobacco in December 2019.324  All existing state adult use cannabis 
laws have similarly established 21 as the minimum purchase and possession 
 
320. See, e.g., H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. 
(Minn. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019); 
H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Va. 2019); S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2018); H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 
2019); H.B. 902, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019); 
H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.H. 2019); S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); A.B. 4497, 
218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); S.B. 1509, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 2009, 2019 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 1527, 
2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); 
S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019); H.B. 
3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2019); W. Va. H.B. 2376. 
321.  H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:9(I)(n)) (N.H. 2019); W. Va. H.B. 2376 § 11-
16A-15(c)(10). 
322. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 15-70(j) (Ill. 2019). 
323. In 1984, Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 
(2012), which threatened to withhold a portion of federal highway funding for states that did not 
establish 21 as the minimum legal age for purchase and public possession of alcohol.  The Supreme 
Court subsequently upheld the Act’s constitutionality in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
324. At least 540 localities and 19 states had adopted 21 as the minimum legal age for tobacco 
purchases before the change in federal law.  CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, “STATES AND 
LOCALITIES THAT HAVE RAISED THE MINIMUM LEGAL SALE AGE FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS TO 21,” 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/sales_21/states_local
ities_MLSA_21.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R2T-2QM5] (listing state and local changes to minimum 
tobacco age laws); Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 1865, 116th Cong. § 603(a)(1) 
(2019) (raising minimum age of sale of tobacco products from 18 to 21 years). 
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age.325  Notably, Canada has adopted a minimum age of 18,326 consistent with 
the country’s minimum alcohol purchase age.327  As with alcohol, provinces 
can adopt their own higher age minimums for cannabis.328  
Based on existing public health evidence, a minimum age of 21 is the most 
appropriate standard for cannabis.  Like alcohol, cannabis has risks associated 
with intoxicated driving.329  Raising the minimum age for alcohol was 
associated with a reduction in motor vehicle accidents,330 and similar public 
health protection is appropriate for cannabis.  Raising the minimum age for 
alcohol was also associated with decreased alcohol consumption among those 
ages 18–20 and 21–25.331  Based on existing scientific evidence, the potential 
negative effects of cannabis use on brain development332 (which continues up 
to approximately age 25) strongly support efforts to reduce consumption by 
 
325. ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.020 (2019); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(a) (2017); 
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(e); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-B. § 1501(1) (2017); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 94G, § 2(b) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.27955(1) (2018); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 453D.110 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.316(1)(a) (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4230a 
(2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.4013(5) (2015). 
326. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16 § 8 (Can.). 
327. Each province or territory sets its own minimum drinking age.  The minimum drinking age 
is 18 in three provinces and 19 in the other ten.  Policy and Regulation (Alcohol): Legal Drinking Age 
in Canada, CAN. CTR. ON SUBSTANCE USE AND ADDICTION, https://www.ccsa.ca/policy-and-
regulations-alcohol [https://perma.cc/2YTN-SPQM]. 
328. As of July 2019, two provinces (Alberta and Quebec) have adopted 18 as the minimum age, 
and all others have adopted 19.  Cannabis in the Provinces and Territories, HEALTH CAN., 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-medication/cannabis/laws-
regulations/provinces-territories.html [https://perma.cc/5AX2-SYY4]. 
329. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 227–30; Rebecca L. Hartman & 
Marilyn A. Huestis, Cannabis Effects on Driving Skills, 59 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 478 (2013); R. 
Andrew Sewell, James Poling, & Mehmet Sofuoglu, The Effect of Cannabis Compared with Alcohol 
on Driving, 18 AM. J. ADDICTION 185 (2009). 
330. Adoption of the national minimum age of 21 for alcohol in the United States was associated 
with a 16% median decrease in motor vehicle crashes, as well as decreased alcohol consumption among 
those aged 18 to 20 and those aged 21 to 25. Age 21 Minimum Legal Drinking Age, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/minimum-legal-drinking-age.htm 
[https://perma.cc/B8H2-94QV]. 
331. Id.  
332. Kirsten Weir, Marijuana and the Developing Brain, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N 48 (2015).  
Considerable development in this area of research is likely as data become available from the ongoing 
Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development (ABCD) Study, a landmark 10-year longitudinal study of 
nearly 12,000 participants supported by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) that will include study 
of the effects of cannabis use, among myriad other factors.  See generally NAT’L INST. ON DRUG 
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young adults.  Assuming similar policy effects on cannabis consumption as for 
alcohol, a minimum age of at least 21 is prudent and would also align regulatory 
frameworks for cannabis, alcohol, and tobacco. 
In nearly all cases, proposed legislative adult use bills set 21 as the legal 
age for purchase and possession333 (as does Illinois’s enacted 2019 
legislation334).  The sole exceptions are two bills in Hawaii that would set the 
age at 18.335  However, both of these bills are primarily aimed at 
decriminalization, rather than the establishment of a legal adult use cannabis 
market in the state.336  Additionally, a New Jersey bill would allow cannabis 
delivery staff to be as young as 18,337 though the bill would authorize sales only 
to those over 21.338 
2.  Flavors and Other Additives 
Flavors have documented impacts on attracting young smokers to 
traditional tobacco products339 and e-cigarettes.340  Flavors disguise the 
 
333. E.g., S.B. 686, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Haw. 2019) (“personal use”); H.B. 902, 101st 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Ill. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 2, 3 (Ky. 2019); H.B. 632, 
2019 Leg, Reg. Sess. § 1 (art. XX(1)(A)) (Md. 2019); H.B. 420, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 1, § 2, subdiv. 
2 (Minn. 2019); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 22 (N.M. 2019); A.B. 1509, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. § 65 (N.Y. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 907(b) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 3108, 2019 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 19-37-2 (W. Va. 2019). 
334. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 1-10, 10-5(a) (Ill. 2019). 
335. H.B. 1515, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Haw. 2019); S.B. 779, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Haw. 
2019). 
336. Haw. H.B. 1515 § 1; Haw. S.B. 779 § 1. 
337. S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 27(h)(4), 29(c) (N.J. 2018). 
338. Id. § 6. 
339. Carrie M. Carpenter, Geoffrey Ferris Wayne, John L. Pauly, Howard K. Koh, & Gregory 
N. Connolly, New Cigarette Brands with Flavors that Appeal to Youth: Tobacco Marketing Strategies, 
24 HEALTH AFF. 1601 (2005); U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE 
AMONG YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2012), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK99237/ [https://perma.cc/WLG7-SMPM]; Andrea C. 
Villanti, Amanda L. Johnson, Bridget K. Ambrose, K. Michael Cummings, Cassandra A. Stanton, 
Shyanika W. Rose, Shari P. Feirman, Cindy Tworek, Allison M. Glasser, Jennifer L. Pearson, Amy M. 
Cohn, Kevin P Conway, Raymond S. Niaura, Maansi Bansal-Travers, & Andrew Hyland, Flavored 
Tobacco Product Use in Youth and Adults: Findings From the First Wave of the PATH Study (2013–
2014), 53 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 139 (2017). 
340. Bridget K. Ambrose, Hannah R. Day, Brian Rostron, Kevin P. Conway, Nicolette Borek, 
Andrew Hyland, & Andrea C. Villanti, Flavored Tobacco Product Use Among US Youth Aged 12–17 
Years, 2013–2014, 314 JAMA 1871 (2015); Grace Kong, Meghan E. Morean, Dana A. Cavallo, Deepa 
R. Camenga, & Suchitra Krishnan-Sarin, Reasons for Electronic Cigarette Experimentation and 
Discontinuation Among Adolescents and Young Adults, 17 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 847 (2015); 
Emily A. McDonald & Pamela M. Ling, One of Several ‘Toys’ for Smoking: Young Adult Experiences 
with Electronic Cigarettes in New York City, 24 TOBACCO CONTROL 588 (2015).  
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unpleasant taste of smoke, and some have even more far-reaching effects.  
Menthol, for example, contributes to nicotine dependence through behavioral 
reinforcement341 and increases nicotine exposure by encouraging breath 
holding.342  Following a Congressional directive in the Family Smoking and 
Tobacco Prevention Control Act, in 2009 FDA banned characterizing flavors 
in cigarettes.343  This prohibition controversially failed to include menthol 
cigarettes or flavored non-cigarette tobacco (e.g., cigars) but still succeeded in 
reducing the probability of being a smoker and number of cigarettes smoked 
among adolescents.344  Congress also directed FDA to address menthol,345 but 
as of March 2020, FDA has not taken any regulatory action.  Local jurisdictions 
are now leading efforts to prohibit other flavored tobacco products, including 
menthol and electronic tobacco products (e.g., JUUL®) that have rapidly 
increased in popularity among youth.346 
In alcohol policy, “control jurisdictions” (those that operate monopolies 
over some aspect of distribution) have banned or restricted a variety of products 
due to flavoring that appeals to youth, among other reasons.347  The FDA has 
also acted to prohibit alcohol manufacturers from adding caffeine to their 
products, deeming it an “unsafe food additive” in the context of alcoholic malt 
beverages.348 
 
341. Karen Ahijevych & Bridgette E. Garrett, The Role of Menthol in Cigarettes as a Reinforcer 
of Smoking Behavior, 12 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. S110 (2010). 
342. Samuel Garten & R. Victor Falkner, Role of Mentholated Cigarettes in Increased Nicotine 
Dependence and Greater Risk of Tobacco-attributable Disease, 38 PREVENTIVE MED. 793 (2004). 
343. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776, 
1799 (2009). 
344. Charles J. Courtemanche, Makayla K. Palmer, & Michael F. Pesko, Influence of the 
Flavored Cigarette Ban on Adolescent Tobacco Use, 52 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. e139 (2017). 
345. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776, 
1804 (2009). 
346. Madison Park & Ron Selig, San Francisco Bans Sales of Flavored Tobacco Products, CNN 
(June 6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/06/health/san-francisco-flavored-cigarettes-
proposition-e/index.html [https://perma.cc/WLG7-SMPM]; Associated Press, Nation’s First E-
Cigarette Ban Proposed in San Francisco, CBS NEWS (Mar. 20, 2019), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/san-francisco-e-cigarettes-temporary-ban-proposed-vaping-juul/ 
[https://perma.cc/GFG2-P5YW]. 
347. Elyse R. Grossman, Jane Binakonsky, & David Jernigan, The Use of Regulatory Power by 
U.S. State and Local Alcohol Control Agencies to Ban Problematic Products, 53 SUBSTANCE USE & 
MISUSE 1229 (2018). 
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Two Vermont bills would prohibit including nicotine or alcoholic 
beverages in cannabis products offered for sale.349  A Virginia bill would 
prohibit additives in edible products that are toxic or harmful to humans or are 
specifically designed to make the product more addictive or to appeal to persons 
under 21.350  A New Hampshire bill would similarly require the newly created 
regulatory agency responsible for cannabis in the state to promulgate 
regulations that include “a prohibition on any vaporization device that includes 
toxic or addictive additives,”351 and would also explicitly prohibit nicotine as 
an additive.352  A Kentucky bill would also charge the regulatory agency with 
restricting additives “that are toxic or increase the likelihood of addiction.”353  
None of the proposed bills explicitly prohibits flavoring agents, though 
implementing regulations could address this and other shortcomings.  
In most states, detailed determinations on questions such as which additives 
are considered toxic, addictive, or attractive to youth would be answered by 
applicable regulatory agencies consistent with the state’s administrative 
rulemaking procedures.  For example, in California’s adult use framework, the 
state Department of Public Health oversees manufactured cannabis products 
and regulates what additives are permitted.354  Among other elements, the 
Department prohibits manufacturing cannabis products containing alcoholic 
beverages and those with additives that “increase potency, toxicity, or addictive 
potential,” including nicotine and caffeine.355  Illinois’s enacted 2019 
 
349. H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 881(a)(3)(F)(ii) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 9 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(3)(F)(ii)) (Vt. 2019). 
350. H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3.2-4151(A)(5) (Va. 2019).  The bill does not 
define who would make such determinations but would presumably leave this to regulation under the 
Board of Agriculture and Consumer Services, which would have authority to adopt additional health 
and safety regulations.  Id. § 3.2-4151(B); see id. § 3.2-4122 (powers and duties of the Board). 
351. H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:9(I)(t)) (N.H. 2019).  This section also authorizes 
restrictions on “types of vaporizers that are particularly likely to be utilized by minors without 
detection,” id., likely a response to the growing popularity of easily concealed nicotine vaporizers such 
as JUUL®. 
352. Id. § 6 (318-F:9(I)(p)(3)). 
353. S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(3)(i) (Ky. 2019).  
354. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17. § 40300 (2018). 
355. Id. § 40300(a)–(b).  However, following a public comment period, the Department of Public 
Health rejected recommendations, including from the authors of this Article, to include naturally 
occurring caffeine (e.g., coffee), as well as menthol and other characterizing flavors, among prohibited 
additives.  CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, DPH-17-010: CANNABIS MANUFACTURING LICENSING, 
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS RECEIVED DURING THE 45-DAY COMMENT PERIOD, (Jan 16, 2019), 
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CEH/DFDCS/MCSB/CDPH%20Document%20Library/DPH170
10_45DayResponses.pdf [https://perma.cc/JTL6-XKN8]; see also DANIEL G. ORENSTEIN, DANIEL G. 
ORENSTEIN, CANDICE M. BOWLING, & STANTON A. GLANTZ, COMMENT ON PROPOSED 
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legislation similarly vests the Department of Public Health with authority to 
adopt and enforce rules for the manufacture and processing of infused products, 
but does not specifically address additives.356  
3.  Advertising and Marketing 
Restrictions on tobacco advertising and marketing efforts are among the 
most universally recommended policy interventions in tobacco control, as 
reflected in WHO FCTC Article 13’s call for a “comprehensive ban on 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship” as consistent with applicable 
constitutional principles.357  A total ban is likely inconsistent with U.S. law, and 
indeed the caveat for national constitutional principles was in part shaped by 
opposition from the United States,358 which nevertheless remains one of only a 
small number of WHO member states that has not ratified the treaty.359  The 
U.S. Surgeon General concluded that tobacco advertising and promotional 
activities are causally related to youth smoking initiation and continuation,360 
and the WHO attributed one-third of youth tobacco experimentation to 
exposure to tobacco advertising.361  Alcohol advertising exposure is similarly 
associated with youth initiation and with overconsumption.362 
Restrictions on speech are disfavored under First Amendment 
jurisprudence; however, government regulation of commercial speech to 
protect consumer health and safety is a well-supported exercise of public health 
authority when applied within appropriate parameters.363  Commercial speech 
is speech proposing a commercial transaction, defined as a form of advertising 
that identifies a specific product for the purpose of economic benefit.364  While 
 
REGULATION: DPH-17-010 (July 3, 2018), 
https://tobacco.ucsf.edu/sites/tobacco.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/Comment%20on%20DPH-17-
010%2C%20Cannabis%20Manufacturing%20Licensing.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TDH-7EM3]. 
356. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 55-5(e) (Ill. 2019). 
357. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 11.  
358. Sean Murphy, Adoption of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
689, 689–90 (2003). 
359. WHO Member States Not Party to FCTC, supra note 96.  
360. U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 339.  
361. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC (2013), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85380/1/9789241505871_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2W2-
QZZC]. 
362. David Jernigan, Jonathan Noel, Jane Landon, Nicole Thornton, & Tim Lobstein, Alcohol 
Marketing and Youth Alcohol Consumption: A Systematic Review of Longitudinal Studies Published 
Since 2008, 112 ADDICTION 7 (2017). 
363. GOSTIN, supra note 221, at 347, 352–53. 
364. Id. at 345. 
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commercial speech nominally receives less constitutional protection than other 
forms of speech (and received none until 1975), these protections are still 
significant.365  For commercial speech about a lawful product that is truthful 
and not misleading, government must show that it has a substantial interest, that 
the regulation of speech advances that interest, and that the regulation is no 
more extensive than necessary to serve the government’s stated interest,366 a 
familiar test originating in Central Hudson.367  
Government has interests in regulating advertising that increases use of 
harmful products, markets age-restricted products to youth, or misleads the 
public.368  Government interest in controlling cannabis use to protect public 
health is almost certainly substantial.  State interests in protecting health, safety, 
and welfare are almost always found to be substantial, including interests in 
prevention of youth smoking, traffic safety, and temperance,369 all three of 
which are closely related to cannabis use, as well.  As a result, the key issues 
for restrictions on cannabis advertising will be the extent to which the 
regulations directly advance this interest and whether the restrictions are more 
extensive than necessary.370 
A Connecticut bill would prohibit “any type of marketing and advertising 
of the sale of recreational marijuana,”371 although the constitutionality of such 
a broad provision may be questionable.372  Other Connecticut bills would bar 
 
365. Id. at 347. 
366. Id. at 347–50. 
367. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  The split 
between federal and state law on the legality of cannabis complicates application of commercial speech 
protections to cannabis.  Depending on state constitutional law, cannabis advertising may receive lesser 
commercial speech protections because the drug is illegal under federal law and thus its advertising 
arguably fails to satisfy a required element for protection under Central Hudson.  Leslie Gielow Jacobs, 
Regulating Marijuana Advertising and Marketing to Promote Public Health: Navigating the 
Constitutional Minefield, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1081 (2017); see also ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, 
PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 23–25.  For purposes of this Article, we presume that 
cannabis advertising has some level of commercial speech protection. 
368. GOSTIN, supra note 221, at 345. 
369. Id. at 350–52. 
370. See id. at 352–55 (detailing commercial speech analysis in public health regulation). 
371. H.B. 5595, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2017). 
372. See, e.g., ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 23–24.  
If appropriately limited to regulation of sales conduct that is non-expressive, restrictions on commercial 
speech may survive judicial scrutiny, though direct regulation of the conduct (e.g., price discounting 
techniques) may accomplish the same objective with less risk of overstepping constitutional 
boundaries. Jacobs, supra note 367, at 1104–06, 1132–33.  Nevertheless, if adequately justified and 
targeted to directly advance a substantial government interest, even restrictions on protected 
commercial speech can withstand constitutional challenge.  Id. at 1117–21. 
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“mass-market campaigns that have a high likelihood of reaching children,”373 a 
stricter standard than those setting audience composition ceilings (e.g., 
prohibiting advertising in publications or media where the percentage of 
viewers under the legal age for purchase is reasonably expected to be above a 
certain threshold374).  Bills in Hawaii and New Hampshire would both similarly 
prohibit “mass-market campaigns that have a high likelihood of reaching 
minors,” and the New Hampshire bill would additionally prohibit promotional 
products and product giveaways.375 
A New Jersey bill would restrict advertising “in ways that target or are 
designed to appeal to [persons under 21],” including depictions of persons 
under 21 or the presence of objects suggesting the presence of a person under 
21, such as toys or cartoon characters, and also restricts “any other depiction 
designed in any manner to be especially appealing to a person under 21.”376 
Multiple New Jersey bills would also impose restrictions on cannabis 
advertising, including: 
• Limiting retailers to a single sign of up to 1,600 square 
inches (approximately 11 square feet) visible to the general 
public; 
• Prohibiting advertising “on television, radio or the Internet 
between the hours of 6:00am and 10:00pm;”377 
• Requiring “reliable evidence that no more than 20 percent 
of the audience . . . is reasonably expected to be under 
[21]”; 
• Prohibiting marketing using location-based devices (e.g., 
cell phones) except under limited circumstances; 
• Prohibiting sponsorship of charitable, sports, musical, 
artistic, cultural, social, or other similar events absent 
“reliable evidence” that no more than 20% of the audience 
is expected to be under 21; and 
 
 
373. H.B. 5458, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 13(10) (Conn. 2018); S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 19(a)(9) (Conn. 2018).  
374. See, e.g., A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 16(9)(c) (N.J. 2018) (allowing cannabis 
advertising only if the licensee “has reliable evidence that at least 71.6 percent of the audience for the 
advertisement is reasonably expected to be 21 years of age or older”); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 7 (tit. 7, § 864(b)) (Vt. 2019) (limiting cannabis advertising “unless the licensee can show that no 
more than 30 percent of the audience is reasonably expected to be under 21 years of age”).   
375. H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2-11(12) (Haw. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. 
§ 6 (318-F:9(I(l)) (N.H. 2019). 
376. A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9(a)(7)(a)(iv) (N.J. 2018) (emphasis added). 
377. It is unclear how such time restrictions could be imposed on web-based advertising. 
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• Prohibiting advertising within 200 feet of schools, 
recreation centers, parks, childcare centers, playgrounds, 
public pools, libraries, or on public transit vehicles, transit 
shelters, or on or in public owned and operated property.378 
A New Mexico bill would explicitly prohibit cannabis product advertising 
via billboard, radio, television, or other broadcast media.379  Anticipating 
possible constitutional challenge, the bill also provides that this prohibition 
would cease to be in effect in the event of federal cannabis legalization.380  The 
bill would also prohibit advertising that: 
• is false, deceptive or misleading, including unproven 
health benefit claims; 
• depicts consumption by persons under 21; 
• is designed using cartoon characters; 
• mimics other product brands; 
• is within 300 feet of a school, church, or daycare center; 
• is in public transit vehicles or stations or on publicly owned 
or operated property; or 
• is an unsolicited internet pop-up.381 
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation similarly prohibits advertising that: 
• is false or misleading; 
• promotes overconsumption; 
• depicts actual consumption; 
• depicts consumption by a person under 21; 
• “makes any health, medicinal, or therapeutic claims”; 
• includes “cannabis leaf or bud” imagery; 
• includes images “designed or likely to appeal to minors, 
including cartoons, toys, animals, or children, or any other 
likeness to images, characters or phrases that is designed 
in any manner to be appealing to or encourage 
consumption” by persons under 21; 
• is within 1,000 feet of schools grounds or a playground, 
recreation center, child care center, public park, public 
library, or game arcade not restricted to adults; 
 
378. N.J. A.B. 3581 § 9(a)(9); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. 8(a)(9) (N.J. 2018). 
379. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 21(A)(1)(a) (N.M. 2019). 
380. N.M. H.B. 356 § 21(B); see also Jacobs, supra note 367, at 1097–98 (noting that 
commercial speech protections in some state constitutions are similar to those of the U.S. Constitution); 
but see ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 16 (noting that 
commercial speech analysis under state law may differ from federal law and that federal protections 
may not apply due to cannabis’ federal illegality). 
381. N.M. H.B. 356 § 21(A)(1). 
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• is on or in public transit vehicles or shelters; 
• is on or in publicly owned or operated property.382 
The Illinois legislation also prohibits promotions incorporating cannabis 
giveaways or any games or competitions related to cannabis consumption.383 
4.  Public Use and On-Site Consumption 
Decades of research have firmly established the link between tobacco 
smoke and cancer, inflammation, fetal harm, impaired immune function, and 
other serious health harms to nearly every organ of the human body.384  
Secondhand exposure similarly causes a variety of harms with no risk-free level 
of exposure.385  The similarity of tobacco smoke and cannabis smoke386 is 
therefore cause for concern.  Moreover, there is already substantial evidence for 
a relationship between cannabis use and negative respiratory effects,387 as well 
as evidence for associations with cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, 
neurological disease, and cancer.388 
The establishment of comprehensive smokefree laws in states and localities 
over the past several decades is an important public health achievement that 
protects the health of employees in enclosed workplaces as well as countless 
members of the community in public places.  Similar restriction on the public 
 
382. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 55-20(a)–(b) (Ill. 2019). 
383. Id. § 55-20(d). 
384. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
INVOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO TOBACCO SMOKE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 3–8 (2006), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44324/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK44324.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NB99-YZ99]. 
385. Id.  
386. Moir, Rickert, Levasseur, Larose, Maertens, White, & Desjardins, supra note 89, at 494. 
387. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 16, 181–96. 
388. Id. at 15–16, 19; Xiaoyin Wang, Ronak Derakhshandeh, Jiangtao Liu, Shilpa Narayan, 
Pooneh Nabavizadeh, Stephenie Le, Olivia M. Danforth, Kranthi Pinnamaneni, Hilda J. Rodriguez, 
Emmy Luu, Richard E. Sievers, Suzaynn F. Schick, Stanton A. Glantz, & Matthew L. Springer, One 
Minute of Marijuana Secondhand Smoke Exposure Substantially Impairs Vascular Endothelial 
Function, 5 J. AM. HEART ASS’N 1, 8–9 (2016); Pal Pacher, Sabine Steffens, György Haskó, & Thomas 
H. Schindler, Cardiovascular Effects of Marijuana and Synthetic Cannabinoids: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly, 15 NATURE REVS. 151, 153–54  (2018); Kelly P. Owen, Mark E. Sutter, & Timothy E. 
Albertson, Marijuana: Respiratory Tract Effects, 46 CLINICAL REV. ALLERGY IMMUNOLOGY 65, 66, 
76 (2014); Madeline H. Meier, Avshalom Caspi, Antony Ambler, HonaLee Harrington, Renate Houts, 
Richard S. E. Keefe, Kay McDonald, Aimee Ward, Richie Poulton, & Terrie E. Moffit, Persistent 
Cannabis Users Show Neuropsychological Decline from Childhood to Midlife, 109 PROCEEDINGS 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. E2657, E2657 (2012); RAJPAL S. TOMAR, JAY BEAUMONT, & JENNIFER C. 
Y. HSIEH, CAL. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, EVIDENCE ON THE CARCINOGENICITY OF MARIJUANA 
SMOKE 1, 46 (2009), https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/crnr/finalmjsmokehid.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6N73-QPJY].   
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use of cannabis and cannabis products is appropriate to avoid undermining 
public health progress by allowing smoking (of any type) in public locations or 
re-normalizing smoking behavior generally.389 
Social equity considerations that attach to public smoking bans when 
applied to cannabis must be addressed,390 but it is typically much easier to 
liberalize a restrictive policy than to ratchet up restrictions on behavior.  The 
long public health battle to reduce secondhand smoke exposure in bars, 
restaurants, and other public locations is a key example of the latter.391  At 
minimum, an effective public health strategy to cannabis regulation should 
include addition of cannabis smoke and aerosol or vapor to existing smokefree 
laws covering tobacco products to prevent erosion of progress reducing 
environmental tobacco exposure.392 
All ten states that legalized adult use prior to 2019 have prohibited public 
use.393  They have also frequently added cannabis to existing smokefree laws.394 
However, some states have explicitly authorized on-site consumption 
exemptions to indoor smoking restrictions395 or allowed localities to do so.396  
Such exemptions threaten to undermine other smokefree laws if the tobacco 
industry attempts to leverage them to create additional smoking spaces in an 
 
389. See Stanton A. Glantz, Bonnie Halpern-Felsher, & Matthew L. Springer, Marijuana, 
Secondhand Smoke, and Social Acceptability, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 13 (2018) (discussing social 
norm change with respect to tobacco and cannabis use). 
390. See, e.g., ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 35–36. 
391. See STANTON A. GLANTZ & EDITH D. BALBACH, TOBACCO WAR: INSIDE THE CALIFORNIA 
BATTLES 1–18 (2000); see, e.g., Andrew Hyland, Joaquin Barnoya, & Juan E. Corral, Smoke-free Air 
Policies: Past, Present and Future, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 154, 155 (2012). 
392. See AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS, MODEL ORDINANCE PROHIBITING SMOKING 
IN ALL WORKPLACES AND PUBLIC PLACES (100% SMOKEFREE) 3–4, 7 (2018), 
https://nonsmokersrights.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/modelordinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D2L-
B4SW]; ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 35–36. 
393. ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.38.020(4), 17.38.040 (2019); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
11362.3(a)(1) (2017); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(d); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-B, § 
1501(2)(A) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 13(c) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.27954(e) 
(2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453D.400 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.381 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, § 4230a(a)(2)(A) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.445 (2015). 
394. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.3(a)(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-B, § 
1501(2)(B) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 13(c) (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, § 4230a(a)(2)(A).  
395. E.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 306.200(a) (2019); see also Memorandum from April 
Simpson, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, to Debbie Morgan, Department of Commerce, 
Community and Economic Development (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://aws.state.ak.us/OnlinePublicNotices/Notices/Attachment.aspx?id=116574 
[https://perma.cc/E95U-X549]. 
396. E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26200(g) (2020). 
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effort to renormalize smoking behavior.  Jurisdictions adopting this approach 
should explicitly prohibit tobacco use in such locations by law and consider 
other limitations to reduce secondhand cannabis smoke exposure for 
employees, such as restricting consumption areas to outdoor locations or 
requiring strict physical separation from employee work areas.  However, only 
completely smokefree environments fully protect nonsmokers.397  
As in existing adult use states, proposed bills (and Illinois’s enacted 2019 
legislation) uniformly prohibit public consumption of cannabis, though there 
are some distinguishing features, as presented in Table 5.  
A Hawaii bill would apply any restrictions on tobacco products and 
smoking to non-medical cannabis.398  Multiple New York bills would similarly 
prohibit cannabis smoking in public and any location where smoking tobacco 
is prohibited by law.399  A New Mexico bill would prohibit smoking cannabis 
in public places but would not include electronic devices creating an aerosol or 
vapor400 in the definition of “smoking.”401  Two New Jersey bills would prohibit 
smoking cannabis in any location where tobacco smoking is prohibited, as well 
as any indoor public place even if tobacco smoking is permitted.402  They would 
also prohibit cannabis smoking within the campuses and facilities of public and 
private higher education institutions.403 
 
397. See, e.g., Ventilation Does Not Effectively Protect Nonsmokers from Secondhand Smoke, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/protection/ventilation/in
dex.htm [https://perma.cc/LD79-GFDU] (listing conclusions from reports by the U.S. Surgeon 
General, WHO, and ASHRAE).  We have recommended in other work that legalizing jurisdictions 
initially prohibit on-site consumption areas, on the basis that it is easier to liberalize policy later when 
evidence on the impacts of cannabis smoke is better established than to regulate such spaces out of 
existence once in operation, as well as concern that existing tobacco restrictions could suffer.  See 
ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 32–36. 
398. S.B. 686, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (329-B(f)) (Haw. 2019). 
399. A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 25 (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 25 (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 2017). 
400. Technically what is produced is an aerosol, a mixture of gasses and particles.  See Thomasz 
R. Sosnowski & Marcin Odziomek, Particle Size Dynamics: Toward a Better Understanding of 
Electronic Cigarette Aerosol Interactions With the Respiratory System, 9 FRONTIERS IN PHYSIOLOGY 
1, 1 (2018) (describing components of emitted aerosols from electronic cigarettes).  However, the 
products are commonly referred to as producing “vapor,” and this is reflected in the language of many 
existing and proposed state laws on public use.  Id. 
401. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 31(C) (N.M. 2019). 
402. A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4(c), 73 (N.J. 2018). 
403. Id. §§ 4(c), 73; S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4(c), 73 (N.J. 2018). 
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A Minnesota bill would add not only smoked cannabis but all lighted and 
vapor cannabis products to the state’s clean indoor air act.404  Taking advantage 
of an opportunity to revise this law, the bill would also add electronic nicotine 
devices (ENDS) to existing indoor smoking prohibitions (e.g., at public 
schools).405 
A Connecticut bill would prohibit all cannabis consumption (including 
smoking, vaping, and other forms) in all places where tobacco smoking is 
prohibited and in any public place.406 
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation prohibits “smoking” cannabis where 
smoking is prohibited by the state’s clean indoor air law without explicitly 
including vapor products,407 but also more generally prohibits “using” cannabis 
(thus any form of cannabis) in any public place,408 which is broadly defined and 
applies to most non-residential locations.409  The legislation also specifically 
prohibits using cannabis “knowingly in close physical proximity to anyone 
under 21 years of age who is not a registered medical cannabis patient” in the 
state.410 
Several state bills would make exceptions to smokefree laws for on-site 
consumption areas, but restrictions on such locations vary.  Some bills would 
allow on-site cannabis consumption,411 others would either allow or require 
consumers to bring their own cannabis.412  Some would require consumption 
areas to be part of a licensed retailer or medical dispensary,413 others would 
allow or require independent licensure,414 and some would allow on-site 
 
404. H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess., art. 3 § 1, subdiv. 4 (Minn. 2019). 
405. Minn. H.F. 420, art. 3 § 1, subdiv. 4, art. 3 § 8, subdivs. 1–2. 
406. S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 21 (Conn. 2018). 
407. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §10-35(a)(4) (Ill. 2019). 
408. Id. § 10-35(a)(3)(F). 
409. Id. § 10-35(a). 
410. Id. § 10-35(a)(3)(G). 
411. E.g., S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (170(5)) (N.Y. 2019) (allowing only retail 
licensees to be licensed for on-site consumption); A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 72(a)(2) (N.J. 
2018) (specifying that consumption areas must be separate from but on the same premises as a cannabis 
retailer or dispensary). 
412. E.g., N.J. A.B. 4497 § 72(a)(2) (“cannabis consumption area” may allow consumption of 
cannabis items “either obtained from the retailer or center, or brought by a person to the consumption 
area”); H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. § 16 (subdiv. 1(b)(3)–(4)) (Minn. 2019) (sale or exchange of 
cannabis on premises prohibited). 
413. E.g., H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6(H) (N.M. 2019), N.Y. S.B. 1527 § 31 (170(5)). 
414. For example, a Connecticut bill would allow “marijuana lounges,” which would be 
“licensed to sell marijuana or marijuana products to consumers solely for on-site consumption.”  H.B. 
5458, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(11) (Conn. 2018) (emphasis added).  This would be similar to many 
alcohol licenses for bars and restaurants. 
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consumption only in conjunction with a producer license415 (similar to a tasting 
room at an alcohol production facility).  Some would allow consumers to leave 
with unused cannabis or cannabis products416 but may require the product to be 
repackaged.417  Frequently, bills authorizing on-site consumption would not 
permit alcohol, tobacco, or nicotine sales or consumption at the same 
location.418  The effects of various restrictions are undetermined, but they are 
likely to impact the number and location of on-site consumption areas.  For 
example, if on-site sales are prohibited, this would limit profit-making potential 
and likely result in fewer licensed venues.  The number and location of on-site 
consumption areas, in turn, will likely influence the extent to which they 
















415. S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 4(B) (N.M. 2019).  This is in part because the bill creates a 
state monopoly on retailer licensure.  
416. E.g., S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 72(k)(1) (N.J. 2018). 
417. E.g., S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 42(l)(1) (N.J. 2018). 
418. E.g., A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 72(i)(2) (N.J. 2018); N.J. S.B. 2703 § 72(i)(2); 
H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. § 16(c)(2) (Minn. 2019) (alcohol); H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. § 3.2-4142(B)(4) (Va. 2019) (allowing cannabis retailers to sell any other product otherwise 
permitted by law other than tobacco or alcohol). 
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TABLE 5: PUBLIC USE PROVISIONS IN PROPOSED BILLS419 




Arizona S.C. Res. 1022 § 1 (4-404) 
Connecticut H.B. 5595 
Illinois [enacted] H.B. 1438 § 10-35(a)(3)(F) 
Minnesota 
H.F. 420 art. 1, § 2, subdiv. 7, art. 4, § 8, 
subdiv. 2(a)(6)(ii)); 
S.F. 619, art. 1, § 2, subdiv. 7, art. 4, § 8, 
subdiv. 2(a)(6)(ii) 
Missouri H.B. 551 § A (195.2153(2)) 
New Jersey 
A.B. 3819 § 3(c); 
S.B. 2702 § 4(c) 
New Mexico S.B. 577 § 23(B) 




Kentucky S.B. 80 § 4 
New Hampshire H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:4) 
New Mexico H.B. 356 § 31(A) 
   
   
 
419. S.C. Res. 1022, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 1 (4-404) (Ariz. 2019); H.B. 5595, 2019 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2019); H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 10-35(a)(3)(F), 10-
35(a)(4) 55-25(3) (as authorized and regulated by localities) (Ill. 2019); H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. 
art. 1, § 2, subdiv. 7, art. 4, § 8, subdiv. 2(a)(6)(ii) (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, 
§ 2, subdiv. 7, art. 4, § 8, subdiv. 2(a)(6)(ii) (Minn. 2019); H.B. 551, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. 
Sess. § A (195.2153(2)) (Mo. 2019); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(c) (N.J. 2018); N.J. S.B. 
2702 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c); N.M. S.B. 577 §§ 4(B), 23(B); H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 
16A-17-3(2) (W. Va. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ky. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st 
Sess. § 6 (318-F:4) (N.H. 2019); H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 31(A) (N.M. 2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–
20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 25 (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 25 
(N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 25, 31 (art. 11, § 178) (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040, 
2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 25, 31 (art. 11, § 178) (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 2895, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 
(21-28.10-8) (R.I. 2018); H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11-16A-5(a) (W. Va. 2019); H.B. 3129, 
2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-5(a) (W. Va. 2019); Conn. H.B. 5458 §§ 1(11), 5; H.B. 632, 2019 Leg, 
Reg. Sess. § 1 (art. XX (1)(B)(3 )) (Md. 2019); Minn. H.F. 465 § 16 (subdiv. 1); N.J. A.B. 4497 §§ 3 
(“public place”), 4(c); N.J. S.B. 2703 §§ 3, 4(c); S.B. 1509, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 4, § 74 (N.Y. 
2019); Va. H.B. 2371 art. 7 § 3.2-4160 (A)(3); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 3 § 3.2-
4151(Va. 2019); S.B. 686, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 329-B(f) (Haw. 2019); S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 21(Conn. 2018); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (tit. 7, §§ 831(5), 833) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 
250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (tit. 7, § 831(5); 833) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (tit. 
7, §§ 831(5), 833) (Vt. 2019); A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c) (N.J. 2018).  
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A.B. 1617 § 25; 
A.B. 3506 § 25; 
S.B. 1527 § 25; 
S.B. 3040 § 25 
Rhode Island S.B. 2895 § 1 (21-28.10-8) 
West Virginia 
H.B. 2376 § 11-16A-5(a); 





Connecticut H.B. 5458 §§ 1(11), 5 
Illinois [enacted] 
H.B. 1438 § 55-25(3) (as authorized and 
regulated by localities) 
Maryland H.B. 632 § 1, art. XX (1)(B)(3) 
Minnesota H.F. 465 § 16(subdiv. 1) 
New Jersey 
A.B. 4497 §§ 3, 4(c); 
S.B. 2703 §§ 3, 4(c) 
New Mexico 
H.B. 356 § 31(A); 
S.B. 577 § 4(B) 
New York 
S.B. 1509 art. 4, § 74; 
S.B. 1527 § 31 (art. 11, § 178); 
S.B. 3040 § 31 (art. 11, § 174); 
Virginia 
H.B. 2371 art. 7 § 3.2-4160 (A)(3); 





Hawaii S.B. 686 § 329-B(f) 
Connecticut S.B. 487 § 21 
Illinois [enacted] H.B. 1438 § 10-35(a)(4) 
New Jersey 
S.B. 2703 § 4(c); 
A.B. 4497 § 4(c) 
New York 
A.B. 1617 § 25; 
A.B. 3506 § 25; 
S.B. 1527 § 25; 
S.B. 3040 § 25 
Vermont 
H.B. 196 § 2 (tit. 7, §§ 831(5), 833); 
H.B. 250 § 2 (tit. 7, § 831(5); 833); 






A.B. 3581 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c); 
S.B. 2702 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c); 
A.B. 4497 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c) 
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A.  Legalization is Dynamic, and States are Poised to Act 
Cannabis policy is evolving quickly.  Medical legalization spread from a 
single state in 1996 to thirty-three states and D.C. in 2018.420  Recreational 
legalization was non-existent until 2012 and in 2018 included ten states and 
D.C.  Given the recent electoral success of legalization campaigns, legalization 
in additional states is highly likely, though the precise form legalization may 
take remains up for debate.421 
Despite the dramatic pace of change in this policy area over the last several 
years, there remains the potential for considerable additional change at the state 
level.  As of July 2019, there were twenty-three states that allow citizens to 
place an issue on the ballot via initiative (not including legislative referenda).422  
Of these, fourteen did not have adult use cannabis laws, five did not have 
comprehensive medical legalization laws, and three lacked even limited 
medical legalization for CBD/low-THC products423  The absence of 
legalization laws in many of these states in combination with recent legal 
changes in other states and overall public opinion trends creates a policy 
vacuum on the issue.  In the absence of legislative action, ballot initiatives are 









420. Marijuana Deep Dive, supra note 10. 
421. Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 90–92. 
422. INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., SIGNATURE, GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION AND SINGLE 
SUBJECT (SS) REQUIREMENTS FOR INITIATIVE PETITIONS (2018), 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/Almanac-Signature-and-SS-and-GD-Requirements.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/45QY-CQ78].  This total does not include an unusual and restrictive process in 
Illinois.  Id.; see also Illinois, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states/state.cfm?id=9 [https://perma.cc/P22S-G2EG]. 
423. Marijuana Deep Dive, supra note 10; see State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49; 
see also infra Table 6. 
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TABLE 6: CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATES WITH INITIATIVE PROCESS424 
State Limited Medical Medical Recreational 
Alaska — Yes (1998) Yes (2014) 
Arizona — Yes (2010) No425 
Arkansas — Yes (2016) No 
California — Yes (1996) Yes (2016) 
Colorado — Yes (2000) Yes (2012) 
Florida Yes (2014) Yes (2016) No 
Idaho No426 No No 
Maine — Yes (1999) Yes (2016) 
Massachusetts — Yes (2012) Yes (2016) 
Michigan — Yes (2008) Yes (2018) 
Mississippi Yes (2014) No No 
Missouri Yes (2014) Yes (2018) No 
Montana — Yes (2004) No 
Nebraska No No No 
Nevada — Yes (2000) Yes (2016) 
North Dakota — Yes (2016) No427 
Ohio — Yes (2016) No 
Oklahoma — Yes (2018) No 
Oregon — Yes (1998) Yes (2014) 
South Dakota No No No 
 
424. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49 (listing medical and adult use laws in all 
U.S. states and territories). 
425. An adult use legalization initiative appeared on Arizona’s 2016 ballot but was narrowly 
defeated, 51.3%–48.7%.  Arizona Marijuana Legalization, Proposition 205 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Marijuana_Legalization,_Proposition_205_(2016) 
[https://perma.cc/RF9X-6KEE]. 
426. The governor vetoed a legislative bill to allow limited medical access in 2015.  State 
Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49. 
427. An adult use legalization initiative appeared on North Dakota’s November 2018 ballot, but 
was unsuccessful.  North Dakota Measure 3, Marijuana Legalization and Automatic Expungement 
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State Limited Medical Medical Recreational 
Utah Yes (2014) Yes (2018) No 
Washington — Yes (1998) Yes (2012) 
Wyoming Yes (2015) No No 
States Without: 3 / 23 5 / 23 13 / 23 
 
Based on electoral results between 2012 and 2018 and various public 
opinion polls,428 voters are highly supportive of medical legalization and 
moderately supportive of recreational legalization as general principles.429  
Depending on how much faith one has in the electorate to be discerning in 
evaluating ballot questions, it may be fair to ask whether, at this current high 
water mark for legalization support, voters will approve any legalization 
initiative that appears at face value to accomplish these goals.  For now, at least, 
it appears that they will not.  For example, Ohio’s 2015 Initiative 3 would have 
legalized both medical and recreational cannabis.430  According to an April 
2015 state poll, 84% of Ohio voters supported medical legalization, and 52% 
supported adult use legalization.431  Yet the initiative failed by a wide margin, 
capturing only 36% of the vote, the lowest of any legalization ballot measure 
of any type in any state since at least 2004.432  The Ohio measure was unusually 
constructed, giving oligopolistic control of the proposed cannabis market to a 
small cadre of interconnected corporate investors who provided nearly all of 
the initiative’s funding support, an arrangement that appears to have contributed 
heavily to its defeat.433  
 
428. See generally Press Release, Quinnipiac University Poll (April 6, 2015), 
https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/sw/ps04062015_Spg72ho.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/Q2XB-L4R7]; 
Medical Marijuana: Votes and Polls, 2000–Present, PROCON.ORG, 
https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=000149 
[https://perma.cc/34C3-9Z4P]; State Polls, NAT’L  ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS 
(NORML), https://norml.org/library/state-polls-legalization [https://perma.cc/3HPM-B4K9].  
429. See Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 77, 105–06 (detailing 
election results for cannabis legalization ballot initiatives). 
430. Ohio Marijuana Legalization Initiative, Issue 3 (2015), BALLOTPEDIA,  
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Issue_3_(2015) 
[https://perma.cc/3B3G-HFXQ]. 
431. Quinnipiac University Poll, supra note 428. 
432. Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 105–06.  
433. David A. Graham, Why Did Ohio’s Marijuana-Legalization Push Fail?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 
3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/where-did-ohios-marijuana-legalizers-
go-wrong/414061/ [https://perma.cc/T3SA-9BZC]; see also Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of 
Grass, supra note 20, at 79, 89.  
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B.  Advantages of Legislative Legalization 
There are potential public health advantages to legislative legalization, 
whether medical or recreational.434  First, legislatively enacted laws are 
considerably easier to change than voter-enacted laws.  With relatively few 
limits, legislatures are free to later change statutes they have enacted.435  This 
allows a legislature to adjust course to correct for, among other issues, drafting 
errors or ambiguities, incorrect assumptions (e.g., tax forecast436), changing 
market dynamics, improved scientific understanding of the health effects of 
cannabis consumption, and the observed impacts of different policy models in 
other jurisdictions. 
In contrast, several states’ laws afford voter-enacted laws substantial 
protection from legislative changes.  For example, unless specifically 
authorized in the initiative language, California law prohibits the legislature 
from amending initiatives without returning to the people for a vote.437  Arizona 
law prohibits the state legislature from amending laws passed by initiative or 
referendum with less than a three-fourths supermajority, and even with such a 
majority, the legislature may only make amendments that further the purpose 
 
434. A legislative approach may also be advantageous for advocates, as Caulkins Coulson, 
Farber, & Vesely explained following the defeat of California’s 2010 recreational initiative 
(Proposition 19) and before Colorado and Washington began the modern wave of recreational 
legalization: “Focusing on propositions may be short-sighted:  To date, propositions have come closer 
to achieving marijuana legalization than has legislation.  However, inasmuch as marijuana legalization 
has never been tried in the modern era and there are many complicated choices and details, it seems 
improbable that the initial design will get it right; likely it will take some trial and error and incremental 
adjustment to get the scheme worked out . . . .  However, propositions are harder to adjust than are 
regimes established by legislation . . . .  If pursuing a proposition, leave the specifics up to the policy 
makers: Some people who voted ‘no’ on Proposition 19 opposed its specifics, not legalization in the 
abstract.  To win these swing voters, proponents should consider propositions that defer the details to 
state legislatures or other state-level policy makers.”  Caulkins, Coulson, Farber, & Vesely, supra note 
116, at 19–20 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). 
435. The principle of legislative entrenchment generally bars a legislature from binding a future 
legislature, for example by requiring a larger legislative majority to change a statute.  Compare Eric 
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666 
(2002) (arguing that prevailing doctrine against legislative entrenchment should be discarded and that 
legislatures should be able to bind future legislatures within the boundaries of other constitutional 
limitations), with John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A 
Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1777–78 (2003) (arguing that the 
prohibition on legislative entrenchment is correct as a matter of law and of good policy). 
436. See, e.g., Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 79 (discussing both 
Colorado’s massive overestimation of projected first year cannabis tax revenue and Washington’s 
comparable underestimation). 
437. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c). 
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of the law.438  To fundamentally alter or repeal the law, the legislature must 
submit the change to the voters via referendum.439  Several other states require 
legislative supermajorities to amend citizen initiatives or require a specified 
period of time to pass before the legislature can amend.440  
State efforts to regulate around voter-enacted marijuana initiatives may also 
face substantial legal challenge.  For example, a Colorado regulation that would 
have required marijuana-focused publications to be kept behind store counters 
in order to reduce access by minors was struck down by a federal court after 
both the responsible regulatory agency and state attorney general’s office 
conceded its unconstitutionality.441  However, the construction of some state 
initiatives, such as those in Washington and Colorado, has allowed legislatures 
to more easily make changes.442 
The difficulties legislatures face in altering voter initiatives exist by design 
because initiatives are a vehicle for bypassing or overruling an unresponsive or 
resistant legislature.443  However, the inflexibility of initiatives can have broad 
and sometimes unintended consequences, especially when the initiative is 
exceedingly specific.444  Rigid legal frameworks imposed by initiative can 
restrict options for correcting errors, mitigating undesirable results, and 
reacting to changing circumstances,445 precisely the type of nuanced, careful, 
 
438. ARIZ. CONST. art IV, pt. 1 § 1(6)(C). 
439. Id. § 1(6)(B)–(C). 
440. See generally Legislative Alteration, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Legislative_alteration [https://perma.cc/X2D7-6PFP]. 
441. Trans-High Corp. v. Colorado, 58 F.Supp.3d 1177, 1179–80 (D. Colo. 2013) (mem.). 
442. Kleiman, supra note 291.  The Colorado legislature used this authority to, among other 
things, address poorly labeled or easily overconsumed edibles.  Id.  In contrast, Arizona’s 2016 
proposal (which ultimately failed by a narrow margin) would have altered the state constitution and 
been exceedingly difficult to change, while the flexibility of California’s legalization initiative was 
between these two types.  Id.  However, lingering outgrowth of California’s earlier adoption of medical 
legalization may limit legislative options in some respects.  For example, the state’s medical 
legalization initiative did not specify a limit on the amount of cannabis a qualified patient could possess 
or purchase.  The legislature subsequently imposed such a limit, but the state supreme court invalidated 
this restriction.  People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 190, 214 (Ca. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
443. John Dinan, State Constitutional Initiative Processes and Governance in the Twenty-first 
Century, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 61, 84–85 (2016) (citing ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: 
INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 291–92, 298 (1999); see 
also Daniel G. Orenstein, Voter Madness? Voter Intent and the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, 47 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391, 391–92 (2015) (arguing that the language of Arizona’s medical cannabis law should 
be interpreted broadly in part because the initiative enacting the law was a direct response to prior state 
legislative resistance). 
444. Dinan, supra note 443, at 84–88.  These concerns are particularly acute when the initiative 
alters a state constitution.  Id. 
445. Id. at 84–85. 
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and responsive policymaking tools frequently cited as necessary for cannabis 
policy in light of limited and fast-changing scientific evidence.446 
Second, legislative legalization allows public health experts and advocates 
to play a more direct role in policy development (if they chose to participate).  
Voter initiatives are entirely the creations of the advocates who draft them.  
While they may adopt a variety of perspectives, they have neither the 
obligations to the public nor the resources of state legislatures.  Legislatures 
have the authority, ability, and responsibility to involve a variety of 
perspectives in their decision-making.  Among other powers, legislatures can 
actively involve public health experts through, among other avenues, expert 
testimony and grant-making to generate analysis. 
Third, legislative legalization better leverages the benefits of the 
“laboratories of democracy.”447  A small number of advocacy groups are 
responsible for most state legalization initiatives to date.448  As a result, states’ 
approaches have been highly similar.  Whether via an enduring state-oriented 
approach449 or eventual federal legalization, greater variety in state policy will 
help demonstrate the effects of various policy decisions and aid future decision-
making.  The findings discussed in Part III illustrate that not only are public 
health principles gaining some traction in legislative legalization proposals that 
has been largely absent in ballot initiatives, but also that state legislatures will 
address problems in different ways, ultimately providing critical evidence to 
aid development of future best practice recommendations. 
C.  The Window for State Legislative Action is Open, But Limited 
Public health advocates have the opportunity to appropriate the momentum 
of the legalization movement and the underlying shift in public opinion to affect 
the positive impacts of legalization (e.g., market regulation) while potentially 
avoiding or at least blunting the negative effects of unfettered cannabis 
commercialization.  Rather than presenting voters or legislators the binary 
choice between prohibition and laissez-faire legalization, public health-oriented 
 
446. Kleiman, supra note 291; CAULKINS, KILMER, KLEIMAN, MACCOUN, MIDGETTE, 
OGLESBY, PACULA, & REUTER, supra note 116, at 151–53. 
447. Berch, supra note 259, at 872.  
448. See RUSCHE, supra note 57. 
449. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper, & Sam Kamin, Cooperative 
Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 74–102 (2015) (arguing in favor of a 
system of “cooperative federalism” in which the federal government permits states with policies 
meeting specific benchmarks to opt out of CSA provisions relating to cannabis and exert exclusive 
control in this area under state law). 
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legalization provides a more nuanced and beneficial middle path grounded in 
historical lessons and hard-learned best practices. 
Some of the public health approaches outlined may seem unachievable in 
the current policy environment.  However, public health policies often progress 
slowly but ultimately yield largescale changes.  Tobacco control is a leading 
example.  In 1965, almost 42% of U.S. adults smoked cigarettes; in 2016 it was 
less than 16%.450  In the 1970s, only the boldest advocates for nonsmokers’ 
rights sought even to require non-smoking sections in restaurants and other 
public places, and their early efforts received limited support from health 
organizations.451  Tobacco companies used cartoon characters in their 
marketing until the practice was proscribed by the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement.452  U.S. law did not prohibit smoking on airplanes until 1990 (and 
until 2000 this prohibition included only domestic flights),453 after over twenty 
years of advocacy to overcome opposition from the tobacco industry and its 
allies.454  The history of tobacco control illustrates that the political and legal 
status quo does not dictate the potential for future public health policy success 
(and also that the road to such success is long and perilous, especially against 
powerful and entrenched industries). 
 
450. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TABLE 47. CURRENT CIGARETTE SMOKING 
AMONG ADULTS AED 18 AND OVER, BY SEX, RACE, AND AGE: UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS 
1965–2016, at 1, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2017/047.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y6X-XSHM].  
Prevalence for specific populations was even higher.  In 1965, over 50% of adult men and nearly 60% 
of adult African American men smoked cigarettes.  Id.  In 2016, those rates had dropped to 17.7% and 
20.3%, respectively.  Id. 
451. See GLANTZ & BALBACH, supra note 391,  at 1–18 (discussing early tobacco control efforts 
relating to California’s failed Proposition 5 in 1978). 
452. PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 
(2019), https://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/MSA-Overview-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QK7X-2CKY].  Prior to the Master Settlement Agreement, in which major tobacco 
companies agreed to accept various restrictions on their business practices, the Federal Trade 
Commission had also filed a complaint alleging that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s “Joe Camel” 
campaign, featuring an anthropomorphic camel cartoon character, violated federal law by targeting 
children and adolescents. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Joe Camel Advertising Campaign 
Violates Federal Law, FTC Says (May 28, 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/1997/05/joe-camel-advertising-campaign-violates-federal-law-ftc-says 
[https://perma.cc/D9YY-YQ5U]. 
453. Press Release, Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, As U.S. 
Celebrates 25 Years of Smoke-Free Airlines, It’s Time to Make All Workplaces and Public Places 
Smoke-Free (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press-releases/2015_02_23_planes 
[https://perma.cc/6LQG-8EGT].  
454. See Peggy A. Lopipero & Lisa A. Bero, Tobacco Interests or the Public Interest: 20 Years 
of Industry Strategies to Undermine Airline Smoking Restrictions, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 323, 324 
(2006). 
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Ballot initiatives are born of frustration with perceived legislative inaction, 
obstinacy, or misalignment of interests.  In the case of cannabis, the myriad 
failures and extensive collateral damage of the War on Drugs makes such 
frustration understandable.  Still, the speedy adoption of legalization via 
initiative has outpaced scientific understanding of cannabis and its effects on 
health, leading to a difficult policy crossroads with no ideal resolution.  The 
best available path forward is the one that most readily allows for course 
correction and minimizes unintended negative effects.  A public health 
approach to cannabis legalization, adopted legislatively, is such a path for states 
unless and until a change in federal law, but the window for doing so will not 
remain open indefinitely. 
Policymakers’ reticence to adopt comprehensive cannabis legalization may 
be prudent in light of the current state of cannabis science.  However, changing 
public opinion has forced the issue.  In states with a ballot initiative process, 
legalization advocates will bring their case directly to voters, 455 and they are 
very likely to succeed.  In states where this process is not available, there is a 
separate but related risk.  As state cannabis markets around the country (and in 
other countries) mature and larger corporate entities enter456 or emerge,457 the 
ability of the nascent legal cannabis industry to influence lawmakers will grow.  
The borders of legalizing jurisdictions will not contain this influence.  If the 
cannabis industry gains sway in state legislatures (or Congress), policy will 
likely favor industry interests at the expense of public health.  To protect public 
health, the best approach is to enshrine a public health approach in legalization 
from the outset, rather than to fight these battles defensively. 
D.  The Stakes for Public Health are High 
The cannabis industry is not, at present, comparable to either the tobacco 
or alcohol industries.  However, both tobacco and alcohol companies, among 
others, have begun to obtain or at least explore entry into the cannabis market.458  
These efforts have, to date, been fairly small in relation to the size and 
 
455. See e.g., Ferner, supra note 72. 
456. See Gelles, supra note 15 (discussing corporate entries in Canadian cannabis market); 
Barry, Hiilamo, & Glantz, supra note 16, at 209 (presenting evidence of longstanding tobacco industry 
influence in legal cannabis market). 
457. See Debra Borchardt, The Cannabis Industry’s Top 12 U.S. Multi-State Operators, GREEN 
MARKET REPORT (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.greenmarketreport.com/the-cannabis-industrys-top-
12-u-s-multi-state-operators/ [https://perma.cc/M2VM-4XBT] (compiling license and valuation data 
for largest multi-state cannabis operations).  
458. Candice M. Bowling, Amy Y. Hafez, & Stanton A. Glantz, Public Health and Medicine’s 
Response to Cannabis Commercialization in the United States: A Commentary, J. PSYCHOACTIVE 
DRUGS, May 19, 2020. 
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positioning of the industries as a whole, likely due to continuing illegality in 
most countries, including the United States at the federal level and are likely to 
change as legalization progresses.  
Many public health best practices developed post hoc to address the 
malfeasance of powerful global industries (e.g., tobacco) that engaged in 
copious and well-documented bad behavior.  As of now, that description does 
not apply to the cannabis industry.  One may argue that policies designed to 
curtail the past abuses of one industry and prevent repetition are not necessarily 
applicable to an industry that has yet to engage in such abuses.  However, a key 
lesson from the history of tobacco and alcohol control is that once industries 
achieve prominence and power, controlling their behavior becomes 
exponentially more difficult.  In regulating cannabis, the opportunity exists to 
structure legal frameworks to create guardrails that prevent or minimalize 
damaging industry behavior, rather than ameliorate its effects after the fact.  
The state of evidence regarding the health harms of cannabis is far from 
ideal.  While cannabis shares some effects with alcohol and some routes of 
administration with tobacco, the three are separate and distinct substances with 
unique characteristics.  For example, tobacco, in all forms, is known to be 
carcinogenic.459  Cannabis smoke is thought to have similar effects because the 
two forms of smoke are nearly identical, save for the presence or absence of 
nicotine and cannabinoids.460  However, while existing evidence is strongly 
suggestive, carcinogenicity of cannabis has yet to be conclusively 
demonstrated,461 and non-smoked forms of cannabis (e.g., edibles) likely have 
different health risks than inhaled cannabis.  Yet carcinogenicity is not the only 
harm tobacco smoke poses.  Smoking causes myriad other negative health 
impacts, particularly on the cardiovascular and respiratory systems, and there 
 
459. TOBACCO AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT, supra note 272, at 20.  
460. TOMAR, BEAUMOUNT, & HIESH, supra note 388, at 77; Moir, Rickert, Levasseur, Larose, 
Maertens, White, & Desjardins, supra note 89, at 494–95. 
461. Cannabis smoke (as “marijuana smoke”) does appear on California’s Proposition 65 list of 
chemicals known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity based on an extensive review of 
existing evidence.  CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHEMICALS KNOWN TO THE STATE TO CAUSE 
CANCER OR REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY 13 (2017), https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/proposition-
65/p65single01272017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ANB-LJMA]; see generally TOMAR, BEAUMOUNT, & 
HIESH, supra note 388.  However, the National Academies, using different inclusion criteria, found 
moderate evidence of no association between cannabis smoking and incidence of lung, head, or neck 
cancers, only limited evidence of association between current, frequent, or chronic cannabis smoking 
and a subtype of testicular cancer, and insufficient evidence to support or refute association between 
cannabis smoking and several other cancers.  NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, 
at 141–58. 
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is evidence that cannabis smoke has a similar risk profile,462 which is to be 
expected given their similarity of composition.  Several other potential negative 
health effects associated with cannabis use (e.g., motor vehicle accidents, 
pediatric overdose injuries, impaired cognition, development of schizophrenia 
or other psychoses, abuse of other substances)463 are likely unrelated to mode 
of use. 
The relative absence of evidence on cannabis’s potential health harms as 
compared to those of tobacco and alcohol may simply be the product of the 
overall dearth of research on cannabis, largely due to legal restrictions in place 
for the past several decades.464  The most comprehensive summary of the 
possible health effects of cannabis as of 2017, both positive and negative, 
comes from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine.465 
While that report does draw important substantive conclusions,466 its major 
recommendations all address the need for additional research.467  Additionally, 
the report notes that all cannabis provided to investigators in the United States 
comes from the National Institutes on Drug Abuse, which sources cannabis 
solely from a single site at the University of Mississippi and does not commonly 
provide forms of cannabis products other than standard dried flower (i.e., no 
edibles, concentrates, etc.).468  Even this flower is not typical of products 
commonly on the market in 2020.  As a result, the absence of clear evidence of 
health harms from non-smoked cannabis products may be due to the absence of 
research, rather than the absence of effects in reality.  Cannabis available for 
research also often fails to reflect the strains, potency, or other characteristics 
of products available on the market (licit or illicit),469 again indicating that 
absence of evidence for any particular effect or association should not be 
understood to be evidence of absence.  The impacts of cannabis use will become 
clearer with time and additional research, but responsible regulation of cannabis 
cannot wait. 
 
462. Wang, Derakshandeh, Liu, Narayan, Nabavizadeh, Le, Danforth, Pinnamaneni, Rodriguez, 
Luu, Sievers, Schick, Glantz, & Springer, supra note 388, at 8. 
463. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 17–21.  Of note, not all such 
associations are necessarily causal in nature. 
464. Bowling, Hafez, & Glantz, supra note 458, at 3. 
465. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 13–22. 
466. See id.  
467. See id. at 9–12. 
468. Id. at 382–83. 
469. Id.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the long history of human cannabis use, evidence of potential health 
harms from the substance is still developing, though there is already more than 
enough to be cause for concern.  Nevertheless, the failures of the War on Drugs 
and the potential benefits of legalization as an alternative have contributed to 
strong policy momentum in favor of adult use cannabis legalization.  To date, 
legalization has primarily arisen from ballot initiatives, but legislatures are 
better situated to craft legalization frameworks that protect public health, and 
many state legislative proposals to legalize cannabis contain public health best 
practice elements absent from existing adult use frameworks. 
Large parts of existing state adult use frameworks created through ballot 
initiatives were based on existing medical cannabis and alcohol laws, neither of 
which embodies public health best practices.  A public health approach to 
cannabis prioritizes public health over other policy goals, including industry 
success and tax revenue.  While exact parameters differ, there is significant 
consensus among government entities, non-governmental health organizations, 
influential international agreements, and health policy scholars on many of the 
most important elements of a public health approach to regulating substances 
like alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis. 
This Article outlines a public health rubric for adult use cannabis 
legalization that embodies sixteen core elements common across existing 
public health scholarship and recommendations.  Broadly, these elements span 
three categories: market and regulatory structures; consumer-facing product 
and retailer regulation; and youth, environmental exposure, and 
denormalization.  Applying this rubric to active cannabis legalization bills 
active as of February 2019 revealed that state legislative proposals adopt a wide 
variety of approaches, but many incorporate at least some public health best 
practices. 
As to market and regulatory structure, several state bills would vest 
significant power in a state health or public health authority, and one would 
create a state monopoly on cannabis sales.  A number of bills would merge 
authority over medical and adult use regulatory systems.  Only a small number 
would explicitly bar industry participation in official regulatory bodies, but 
most would preserve local authority to limit or prohibit operation of cannabis 
businesses.  Several bills would designate significant revenue to cannabis-
related health and safety purposes, and most would enshrine meaningful 
enforcement mechanisms in state law to promote oversight and compliance. 
In consumer-facing product and retailer regulation, many state bills 
appeared to leave comprehensive packaging and labeling provisions to future 
consideration via regulation, but a small number would require minimalist 
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packaging approaching a plain packaging standard.  The few bills that specify 
warning label content would address only specific populations like children and 
pregnant women, but one enacted bill requires limited but direct general 
warnings about possible health hazards of cannabis use.  Some bills would 
prohibit direct consumer access to cannabis products or access via vending 
machines, drive-through windows, and internet-based sales platforms; a small 
number would also restrict cannabis outlet density, and a few would limit 
operating days and times. 
Regarding youth, environmental exposure, and denormalization, almost all 
of the proposed bills would adopt a minimum legal age of 21, and many would 
prohibit some harmful additives, notably nicotine and alcohol.  Several bills 
would ban cannabis advertising that targets, appeals to, or is likely to reach 
persons under 21, and one would bar cannabis advertising entirely in several 
types of media.  Most bills would prohibit cannabis consumption, or at least 
cannabis smoking, in public places where tobacco use is prohibited. 
Legislatures are considering a broader array of cannabis control options 
than ballot initiative approaches have offered to date.  In many cases, legislative 
proposals incorporate several public health best practices based on tobacco and 
alcohol control.  While few, if any, of the legislative proposals analyzed appear 
ideal from a public health perspective, they nevertheless have advantages over 
ballot initiatives, including that legislative actions are considerably easier to 
refine and change over time as evidence accumulates and the consequences of 
different policy options become known.   
Absent legislative action, legalization advocates will continue to use ballot 
initiatives to achieve their policy goals, and the nascent legal cannabis industry 
will continue to cultivate legislative influence.  Once industry-friendly policies 
become entrenched in law, they will be difficult to change.  Legislatures should 
proactively adopt legalization measures to preempt weaker advocate-driven 
initiatives and future industry-influenced legislation.  Legislative legalization 
may not be ideal based on the state of existing evidence, but it is the best 
available path forward in a situation where the status quo is demonstrably 
harmful, and the other path potentially allows the repetition of past mistakes in 
tobacco and alcohol regulation.  Legalization carries both opportunities and 
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APPENDIX 
We developed a set of active proposed legislation using WestLaw in 
February 2019 with the following search string: advanced: (marijuana 
marihuana cannabis) /50 (“adult use” “personal use” recreational legalize 
legalization).  We limited results to past twelve months and excluded 
jurisdictions with existing adult use laws (Alaska, California, Colorado, District 
of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, and 
Washington). 
This search yielded 234 results.  We then rejected duplicates and those that 
did not address any form of legalization or only modified an existing program 
based on review of available summary or abstract, yielding ninety-three results.  
Application of inclusion criteria yielded a final set of fifty-two bills in eighteen 
states for full review, as presented in Table A1, below.  In July 2019, we revised 
the analysis to include Illinois’s successful H.B. 1438 as enacted.  We did not 
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TABLE A1: LIST OF REVIEWED LEGISLATION 
State Year Bill # 
Arizona 2019 S.C. Res. 1022 
Connecticut 2018 H.B. 5458 
Connecticut 2019 H.B. 5595 
Connecticut 2019 H.B. 6863 
Connecticut 2018 S.B. 487 
Connecticut 2019 S.B. 496 
Connecticut 2019 S.B. 744 
Hawaii 2019 H.B. 1515 
Hawaii 2019 H.B. 1581 
Hawaii 2019 H.B. 291 
Hawaii 2019 S.B. 442 
Hawaii 2019 H.B. 708 
Hawaii 2019 S.B. 686 
Illinois 2019 H.B. 2477 
Illinois 2019 H.B. 902 
Illinois 2019 H.B. 1438 [enacted] 
Indiana 2019 H.B. 1685 
Kentucky 2019 S.B. 80 
Maryland 2019 H.B. 632 
Minnesota 2019 H.F. 265 
Minnesota 2019 H.F. 420 
Minnesota 2017 H.F. 4541 
Minnesota 2019 H.F. 465 
Minnesota 2019 S.F. 619 
Mississippi 2019 S.B. 2349 
Missouri 2019 H.B. 157 
Missouri 2019 H.B 551 
New Hampshire 2019 H.B. 481 
New Hampshire 2019 H.B. 722 
New Jersey 2018 A.B. 3581 
New Jersey 2018 A.B. 3819 
New Jersey 2018 A.B. 4497 
New Jersey 2018 S.B. 2702 
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State Year Bill # 
New Jersey 2018 S.B. 2703 
New Mexico 2019 H.B. 356 
New Mexico 2019 S.B. 577 
New York 2019 A.B. 1617 
New York 2019 A.B. 2009 
New York 2017 A.B. 3506 
New York 2019 S.B. 1509 
New York 2019 S.B. 1527 
New York 2017 S.B. 3040 
Rhode Island 2017 S.B. 2895 
Vermont 2019 H.B. 196 
Vermont 2019 H.B. 250 
Vermont 2019 S.B. 54 
Virginia 2018 H.B. 2371 
Virginia 2018 H.B. 2373 
West Virginia 2019 H.B. 2331 
West Virginia 2019 H.B. 2376 
West Virginia 2019 H.B. 3108 
West Virginia 2019 H.B. 3129 
 
 
